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The United States Supreme Court's search and seizure 
decisions have for decades prompted scholars to complain 
about the Court's Fourth Amendmene interpretive "mess . ..:~ 
• Professor of Law, William and Mary. The author thanks the National 
Center for Justice and Rule of Law at the University of Mississippi Law School 
for funding this Article and symposium held on April 12, 2002; the School 
received a grant from the Office of Justice Programs at the U.S. Department of 
Justice (2000-DD-VX-0032). The author also appreciates the research assistance 
provided by Amy Bargerhoff and Melanie Conrad. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text of the Fourth Amendment provides that 
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These scholars have railed against the Court's inconsistent 
approaches in deciding the constitutionality of investigatory 
practices. Undoubtedly, the Court's decisions during the next 
decade will continue to contain these multiple, conflicting 
interpretive paths when applying the Fourth Amendment to 
governmental officials' use of technology during investigations. 
We can, however, stop chiding the Court for its 
unpredictability by embracing postmodern perspectives,3 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or aftirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized." I d. 
2 Ronald B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973). Professor David Sklansk.y 
in 1997 wrote of the "old mess" and the "new consensus" on the Court. David A. 
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 271, 291-92. He summarized well the scholarly 
critique: 
Complaints about the disarray of Fourth Amendment law have long been 
a staple of legal scholarship. It has not been thirty-five years since Roger 
Dworkin first called Fourth Amendment cases "a mess" and Anthony 
Amsterdam said this was an understatement. Nearly two decades ago, 
Silas Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman found "virtual unanimity" 
that "the Court simply bad made a mess .of search and seizure law." 
More recently, Akhil Amar bas described Fourth Amendment law as 
"jumble[d]," "contradictory," and-of course-a "mess." As Morgan Cloud bas 
noted, "[c]ritics of the Supreme Court's contemporary Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence regularly complain that the Court's decisions are," among 
other things, "illogical, inconsistent, . . . and theoretically incoherent." 
ld. at 291-92 (citations omitted); see also Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 
DUKE L.J. 787, 787-88, 801 (1999) (referring to the Fourth Amendment "mess" and 
stating that "each doctrine is more duct tape on the Amendment's frame and a 
step closer to the junkyard"); David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward Wa"antless 
Auto Searches: Suggestions from a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REv. 545, 571 
(2000) (citing a metaphor related to "mess"- the proverbial "tarbaby"). According to 
Professor Craig M. Bradley, the Fourth Amendment is "the Supreme Court's 
tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that bas ensnared the 'Brethren' 
in such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them more 
profoundly stuck." ld. (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1468 (1985)). 
• For a discussion of postmodernism, see infra text accompanying notes 4-5, 
8-12, 17-20, 23, 35-46, and 62-112. But see Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 521, 
522 (1992) (stating that criminal-law scholarship "bas not yet earned the right to 
subject itself to postmodem critiques because it has not yet fully passed into or 
through the modem phase"). 
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which help us understand why the Court has no constant 
guiding principle or principles. Postmodernists would expect 
multiple, conflicting constructions of the Fourth Amendment 
because "interpretation" is merely a community construct.4 
Because multiple communities compose our society; (with 
4 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. LlTOWITl, POSTMODERNISM PHILoSOPHY AND LAW 11 
(1997) (stating the postmodernists "argue that reason is not a uniform faculty in 
all humankind but rather socially constructed; it is always situated within 
existing practices and discourses, and it will therefore be biased or slanted in 
favor of existing power relations"); J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern 
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966, 1972 (1992) [hereinafter Balkin, 
Postmodern Constitutionalism] (stating that postmodem philosophy "view[s] 
knowledge as an activity infused with social interaction and power rather than 
merely a set of articulable propositions or truths"). Professor Angela Harris's 
definition of postmodernism also rejected the notion of objective truth: 
[Postmodernism] suggest[s] that what has been presented in our social-
political and our intellectual traditions as knowledge, truth, objectivity, 
and reason are actually merely the effects of a particular form of social 
power, the victory of a particular way of representing the world that then 
presents itself as beyond mere interpretation, as truth itself. 
Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 
741, 748 (1994) (quoting Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of 
Representation, 2 TIKKuN 28, 30 (July/Aug. 1987)); see also Scott L. Cummings & 
Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 
443, 452 (2001) (describing the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which 
began in the late 1970s, as having as its "project" the revelation of "power 
hierarchies embedded in liberal individual rights"; describing CLS writings as 
"showing the indeterminacy of legal rules and the inherently political choices of 
underlying the current legal order"); Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist 
Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (2001) (using to postmodernism 
"to designate the shift in theory from an approach that focuses on the search f()r 
reality to an approach that focuses on culturally constructed social meanings"). See 
generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 7-14 (1998) 
(describing how the time in which we live shapes our lives and perspectives). But 
see J. Gregory Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo's Social Statics, 79 TEx. L. REv. 737, 739 
(2001) (advocating that society should view law as an "evolutionary institution," one 
seeking "objective knowledge"; under this view of law, "law's legitimacy arises from 
objective knowledge that the particular legal rule at issue is superior to all other 
known means of ordering a specific kind of relationship or transaction"). Mr. Sidak 
also has criticized the Court and scholara for constructing doctrines and theories 
that are "inherently nonfalsifiable." (stating that "(N]onfalsifiable rationales for 
constitutional decisions tend to increase the size of the state, which derivatively 
increases the power and prestige of the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and legal 
clerisy in which law professors rank highly."). 
• See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321-
22 (1997) (describing American society as containing multiple "status groups," 
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scholars6 and the justices on the Court as examples of 
which may arise because of "common styles of life and common senses of honor, 
prestige, or moral rectitude" or because of "religious and ethnic identities); 
Charles W. Collier, Law As Interpretation, 16 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 779, 817-23 
(2000) (distinguishing between a community, which shares particular values, and 
society, which has diverse, divergent values). 
• Legal academic scholars represent numerous contrasting communities. For 
example, Professors Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, who have described 
themselves as centrists and pragmatists, wrote a book vehemently attacking 
another academic community, one they labeled "radical multiculturalists" and 
paranoid "extremists." DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL 
REAsON: THE RADICAL AsSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICA 9, 11, 133 (1997) 
(characterizing their own arguments as "harsh," but necessary because radical 
multiculturalism has "serious, profound, and dangerous flaws"). Their vitriolic book 
triggered academic salvos from other scholarly communities. See, e.g., Kathryn 
Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 1091, 1092, 1126 (1998) 
(arguing that Farber and Sherry heightened the "legal culture wars" and that 
their "flawed and inflammatory critique moves us in precisely the wrong 
direction"); John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior: A Critical 
Response to the Hegemonic "'TruthD of Daniel Farber and Suzzana Sherry, 83 
MINN. L. REv. 1589, 1590, 1609 (1999) (arguing that Farber and Sherry's "truth" 
"operates to deny humanity to . . . people of color in the United States" and their 
book is "an expression of cultural racism"); Anne M. Couglin, C'est Moi, 83 MINN. 
L. REv. 1589, 1621, 1622 (1999) (noting the hostile tone of the book and faulting 
the authors, "at least some of the time, for claiming that the political is the 
truth"); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 
MINN. L. REv. 1637, 1640 (1999) (describing the book as a "diatribe" against 
critical race theorists"); Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, 
and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795, 808 (1999) (rejecting Farber and Sherry's view 
that radical multiculturalists have implicitly attacked tenured Jewish lawyers and 
professors, but stating that "[i]t is curious that two Jewish scholars understand 
what is means to be a member of a minority ethnicity when it is their ethnicity 
under attack-or perceived attack," and adding "that is the whole point of 
perspectivism"); Francis J. Mootz, Ill, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming 
Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 605, 606 (1998) 
("By equating 'reason' with 'truth,' Farber and Sherry make a diagnostic error 
that one might expect from the country doctors who embrace right-wing legal 
ideologies but which is unforgivable for such talented and level-headed 
practitioners"); Edward J. Rubin, Jews, Truth, and Critical Race Theory, 93 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 525, 527 (1999) (rejecting their view that critical race theory casts 
aspersions at Jewish scholars, but describing their anti-Semitic argument as a 
"brilliant rhetorical move"). Some scholars, who would want to be called 
"traditionalists," have condemned the innovative scholarship styles and 
explorations of other scholars as reflecting the "Law Political Correctness (LPC) 
ideology." See Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Review Articles, 
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 233, 235, 237-76 (1999) (denigrating authors in the 
following order: Mary Jo Frug (number one pick for LPC), Patricia Williams, 
Madeline Morris, Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel, Derrick Bell, Richard 
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numerous, contrasting communities),7 we should anticipate 
different constructions of the Fourth Amendment. 
Even though postmodern philosophy rejects the idea of an 
objective grand, unifying theory,8 the loss of an objective 
constitutional interpretation should not dishearten us or make 
us fear that nihilism is right around the corner, 9 ready to 
grab and rob us of vitality as members of the legal community 
Delgado, Anthony D'Amato, Marie Ashe, Robin West, and Paul Butler); see also 
RoBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 7 
(1991) ("exagerat[ing) only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the 
law-and-society group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the law-
and-society scholars believe that the law-arid-economics theorists are not only out 
of touch with reality but also short on humanity"). 
7 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law 
and Politics, 110 YALE L. J. 1407, 1442-43 (2001). In analyzing the Bush v. Gore, 
121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), Professor Balkin has described the Court's merging of 
politics and decisionmaking: 
[It) was the conservatives who were making the equal protection 
argument and extending the Warren Court precedents; it was the liberals 
who were urging deference to the states' legal processes . . . . The 
conservatives used whatever arguments were available to promote George 
W. Bush's election, while the liberals offered the arguments that would 
have helped Al Gore. This is a more overt collapse of the boundary 
between law and politics than Critical Legal Studies would normally 
predict, although it is perhaps consistent with cruder forms of legal 
realism. 
Id. In addition, Professor Balkin has noted that an argument that seems "loony" 
may become "positively thinkable" depending upon the status of the person making 
the argument. Id. at 1444 (noting law relies heavily on "institutional authority"). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 62-92. 
9 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and 
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1984): 
[T)he absence of determinacy, objectivity, and neutrality does not condemn 
us to indifference or arbitrariness, nor make it ridiculous to ask, or 
impossible to answer, the question of what we should do or how we 
should live. The lack of a rational foundation to legal reasoning does not 
prevent us from developing passionate moral and political commitments. 
On the contrary, it liberates us to embrace them. 
ld.; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 157-62 (1988). Professor 
Levinson has described how Dean Paul Carrington of Duke Law School had argued 
that legal nihilists "have an ethical duty to choose a career other than teaching 
law." Id. at 157. Levinson responded with a question: "Does socializing the young, 
including fledgling lawyers, into the central tenet of the faith-defmed by Lincoln as 
'reverence for the law'-allow toleration within the schoolhouse of the 'civil atheist'?" 
Id. at 162. 
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and communities within society. 10 Instead postmodernism 
perspectives allow us to see the "'language games' that arise 
with respect to different spheres of social life, each incomplete 
and constantly subject to alteration and development. "11 By 
examining the language games the Court has used to 
construct what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search," we 
are better able see the numerous roads from which the Court 
could have selected. 12 
10 See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 6, at 638, 640 (describing that a "plurality of 
discourses yields perspective and clarity," not "relativistic chaos of 
incommensurate group identities"). 
11 Balkin, Postmodem Constitutionalism, see supra note 4, at 1972; see also 
GUYORA BINDER & RoBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CruTICISMS OF LAW 122 (2000). 
Professors Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg noted that philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein used the term "language games" to describe the uncertainty of 
meaning in words, in contrast to Fernand de Saussure, who viewed language as a 
"sign system" with "a discrete body of rules," which functioned in a system with 
"a definite boundary." Id. They described Wittgenstein's view of language and 
meaning: 
Since meaning is use in his [Wittgenstein's] pragmatist scheme, 
understanding a sign means competence in using it as discourse. Such 
discourses do not have hard boundaries-the range of moves that may be 
recognized as going on with a linguistic practice, as "within rules," cannot 
be exhaustively specifled in advance and is contingent on the responses of 
other participants in the game. There is no common feature, for example, 
that all correct uses of a word must have. Correct uses are unified only 
by a "family resemblance," a set of "overlapping" characteristics not 
specifiable in advance. 
Id. at 122-23. Professor Dennis Patterson has also used the term "language-game" 
to describe discourse in postmodernism: 
[T)he question "is this law valid?" has no point for the "knowledge" 
required to answer the question is a knowledge that can never exist. In 
postmodernity, legitimation of first-order discourses (e.g. law and science) 
by resort to second-order discourses of reason (e.g. philosophy) is replaced 
with a picture of knowledge as a move within a game, speciflcally a 
"language game." 
Dennis Patterson, Postmodemism/Feminism/Law 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 256 n. 
9 (1992). 
12 See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 6, at 638-39. Professor Mootz has described 
critical legal theorists as seeking to reveal the inherent choices courts faces in 
interpreting the law: 
Much of the work by critical race theorists, radical feminist, and gay 
legal scholars . . . seek to displace the conceit that law operates as a 
rational enterprise, not by claim that law is hopelessly irrational, but by 
demonstrating that law often requires a reasonable judgment as between 
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In examining the Court's language games, this Article 
describes rhetorical tools that the Court has used in deciding 
cases.13 Instead of despairing at the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudential "mess," this Article invites the reader to ask 
what the "mess" tell us about policing in our society.14 By 
discerning the lack of clear, objective rules, we are able to 
view legal doctrines, principles and interpretations as 
I d. 
two or more logically acceptable resolutions of any given issue. The 
radical critique discloses connections between the seemingly "natural" 
presuppositions of judgment by tracing them to constitutive social 
processes that embody contingent and debatable beliefs about, inter alia, 
race, gender, and sexual orientation. 
13 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THOMAS D. RoWE, REBECCA L. BROWN, & 
GIRARDEAU A SPANN, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 1 
(2d ed. 2000) (stating that even though "widespread consensus does exist that the 
constitutional text, history, structure, and precedent are valid sources for 
constitutional advocacy and decisionmaking, deep divisions !have arisen) over their 
use and their very nature"); J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction: 
Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1994) (arguing that 
"deconstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different 
purposes depending upon the moral and political commitments of the 
deconstructor"); Linda Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal 
Truth, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 727, 754 (1999) (stating that judges ultimately have to 
decide which rhetorical tool best fits a particular case: "slippery slope" argument, 
"floodgates of litigation" argument, "plain language" argument, "deterrence" 
argument, "counter-majoritarian" argument and "framer's intent" argument); 
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1377 (1995) ("In virtually all cases, the judge 
shapes her raw material. She picks her rhetoric to foreshadow the result"); Robin 
West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic Success Stories, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 995, 995 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court "tells stories about our 
collective past-our political and social history-to support the results for which it 
argues"; adding that "those political and social histories are not simply true or 
false: like stories of fact and precedent, such histories are a blend of fact and 
falsehood"). 
1
' Professor Laurence H. Tribe in 1988 raised a similar, but different, question 
about the Supreme Court's wildly inconsistent state-action decisions. LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1691 (2d ed. 1988). He stated that "it is 
possible to construct an 'anti-doctrine,' an analytical framework which, in 
explaining why various cases differ from one another, paradoxically provides a 
structure for the solution of state action problems." Id. Professor Tribe 
characterized this approach as "the way out of the forest is through the trees. • 
Id. In contrast, this Article does not offer a structural solution to the "mess," but 
rather views the inconsistencies under the Fourth Amendment as lenses to 
examine the culture as seen by the Supreme Court justices. 
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reflecting our society, the "small-'c' constitution," a ter,m 
Professor David A. Strauss has used in discussing the 
relationship between the written Constitution and its 
interpretation. The "small-'c' constitution" refers to the 
"fundamental institutions of a society, or the constitution in 
practice. "15 For him, "the forces that bring about 
constitutional change work their will almost irrespective of 
whether and how the text of the Constitution is changed. "16 
One leading postmodern scholar, Professor Jack Balkin, 
has contended that the best way to use postmodern 
perspectives is to ask the following question: "How have 
changes in technology, communication, and the organization of 
living and working changed the public's understanding and 
practice of law, the Constitution, human rights and 
democracy?"17 His question has special significance when 
police officers, lawyers, and judges question whether 
governmental officials' use of new technology would violate the 
Fourth Amendment, particularly after the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001. Since adoption of the Fourth Amendment 
in 1791, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
confronted the question of how to interpret the Fourth 
Amendment in light of technological developments, but the 
rapid growth of technology in our contemporary world 
heightens our need to understand the Court's definition of 
16 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 IIARV. 
L. REv. 1457, 1459-60 (2001). 
18 Id. at 1458-59. Professor Strauss establishes the importance of current 
society in interpreting the Constitution by examining four propositions: 
First . . . sometimes matters addressed by the Constitution change even 
though the text of the Constitution is unchanged. Second, . . . some 
constitutional changes occur even though amendments that would have 
brought about those very changes are explicitly rejected. Third, when 
amendments are adopted, they often do no more than ratify changes that 
have already taken place in society without help of an amendment. The 
changes produce the amendment, rather than the other way around. 
Fourth, when amendments are adopted even though society has not 
changed, the amendments are systematically evaded. They end up having 
little effect until society catches up with the ambitions of the amendment. 
Id. at 1459. In short, society projects meaning (or no meaning) onto an 
amendment; the text does not give us its meaning, but society does. 
17 Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, see supra note 4, at 1977. 
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what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Postmodern constitutional law theory recognizes the 
evolving nature of law. It helps us to see that Fourth 
Amendment analysis is a product of our times. By considering 
several themes of postmodernism, 18 we are able to view 
justices' and scholars' offering constructions of the law rather 
than "interpretations. "19 As one postmodernist has stated, the 
"reigning mythology of American law and legal studies ... 
typically frames law as if it were a priori subject to the 
dictates of reason, intelligence and really good normative 
arguments."20 The metaphor of "constructing" law as opposed 
to "interpreting" law highlights communities' projecting their 
meaning in text. 21 The perception of the Court's shifting 
paradigms and inconsistencies may not only reflect our 
particular communities' values, but also suggests changes in 
our society or, in the context of this Article, particular changes 
in technology. 22 
Part I discusses postmodernism. It reveals that both 
18 Professor Morgan Cloud has stated that "pragmatism commands that 
decisionm.akers should not be bound by antecedent principles or rules; they should 
make decisions grounded in social and physical realities." Morgan Cloud, 
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 199, 212 (1993). In contrast, postmodernists do not believe that "antecedent 
principles and rules" actually constrain decisionmakers. In addition, under 
Professor Cloud's characterization of pragmatism, this approach can be 
"conservative" when "rooted in contextualism" because it "empowers instrumental 
impulses." Id. at 211. In contrast, postmodernists believe that their view of 
interpretation allows decisionmak.ers great latitude, affording liberal, conservative, 
down-the-middle-of-the road constructions. See Stephen Feldman, The Supreme 
Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REv. 673, 678-79 
(2000). 
19 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REv. 
1047, 1102 n.198 (2002). 
20 Id. 
21 For a discussion of textual arguments, see infra text accompanying notes 
87-90, 103-12. 
22 See text accompanying infra notes 88-102; see also Christopher Slobogin, 
Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules 
Governing Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393 (2000) (citing empirical studies to 
challenge the Court's characterization enhanced home surveillance and its 
perceived intrusiveness). 
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conservatives and liberals may use the insights of 
postmodernism to further their communities' agendas or 
goals.23 As many scholars have noted, the word "rhetoric" 
itself is susceptible to different definitions24-including the 
"ignoble art of persuasion, "25 the enterprise of describing the 
23 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 18, at 678 (stating that "postmodernism is 
politically ambivalent" and noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice 
Scalia's "political conservatism does not prevent them from being 
postmodernists."); Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be 
Postmodern? 42 BUFF. L. REv. 317, 325 n.18 (1994) (stating that "two general 
approaches to postmodernity exist: a radical approach and a reconstructive 
approach." The "radical approach seeks an abrupt break with modernity and 
modem theories, while the reconstructive approaches uses both modem and 
postmodem elements in their attempt to reconstruct critical social theory"); Peter 
C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodernism Thought and Its Implications for 
Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2512 n.24 (1992) (stating that 
"postmodernism can serve the interests of right-wing dissenting or nonmainstream 
ideas as well as marginal left-wing perspectives"). But see Dennis W. Arrow, 
Spaceball (Or, Not Everything That's Left Is Postmodern), 54 VAND. L. REV. 2381, 
2384-85, 2397 (2001) (generally describing postmodernists as embracing a "Leftist 
Vision"). 
•• See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The 
Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL Enuc. 155, 
155 (1999) (stating that the "rhetoric of legal discourse believes that writing is a 
process for constructing belief, not knowledge"); Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional 
Discourse and Its Discontents: An Essay on the Rhetoric of Judicial Review, in 
THE RHEToRIC OF LAw 225, 225-26 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1994} (invoking Plato's and Aristotle's works to describe two meanings for 
"rhetoric" -argument to derive "the meaning rather than the truth of an event" 
and the "ability to twist and manipulate words for the purposes of winning"); 
Linda Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 727, 729 (1999) (rejecting characterization of "rhetoric" as "sweet talk" or 
manipulation and instead defming it as "the articulation of practical reason, a 
bringing to words, and thereby experience, of practical deliberation that resists 
formulation as rules or facts and may even become clearest for both the speaker 
and the audience at times as analogy, metaphor, story, or image"); Richard A 
Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1421, 
1422 (1995) ("'[r)hetoric' is both broader and narrower than 'style.' It is broader 
because it has, since Aristotle, connoted a process or reasoning as well as the 
medium of verbal expression, a process that Aristotle contrasted with logic and 
other modes of exact reasoning as being the mode appropriate for debate and 
deliberation over matters of deep uncertainty."); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and 
Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546, 1548 (1990) (describing 
"rhetoric" as "the discipline, sometimes the metadiscipline, in which objects of 
formal study are the conventions of discourse and argument" and adding that 
"[r)hetoric offers us a set of tools for thinking about the discursive conventions 
within which we work"). 
23 James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural 
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probable "meaning" of an evene6 or any type of argument. 27 
What distinguishes "crass manipulation" from probable 
"meaning" depends upon a particular community's 
experiences. 28 Some communities find arguments to be "crass 
manipulation" but others will embrace the argument, labeling 
it a "truth. "29 The difference in perception depends upon a 
particular community's constructed standards, which arise 
from its embedded experiences. In short, that which seems 
persuasive (or that which seems "true") "must always be a 
social construction," one mediated by our "social, cultural, 
linguistic, and historical circumstances. "30 This article, with 
its postmodernism perspectives, considers "rhetoric" as 
indicative of cultural or community meaning rather than 
objective, universal "truth. "31 In short, different communities 
and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 687 (1985) (applying this denotation 
to "the standard modem condemnations of government propaganda and of the 
kind of advertising practiced by the wizards of Madison Avenue"); see also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 256 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that the 
"commonest meaning of the word 'rhetoric' in every day speech . . . [is] empty 
verbiage"). 
26 See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 24, at 226 (using the term "rhetoric" to 
describe meaning, not truth, for questions not capable of being placed in 
syllogisms, such as whether a "particular culture was in decline"). 
27 See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551 (stating that Stanley Fish's 
interpretative theory maintains that "[a]ll arguments . . . are rhetorical in nature" 
and that "we cannot logically maintain that certain statements are true 
representations of reality while others are 'mere' rhetoric"). The truthfulness of a 
statement depends upon a community's standards: "those arguments and 
statements that we consider persuasive are experienced by us as true or as 
substantive, while those we find empty or contrary to our understandings are 
experienced as rhetorical." Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551-52. 
26 Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551-52. 
29 See, e.g., Schnack, supra note 23, at 2551. 
•• Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551. 
31 Professor James Boyd White has described law as "constitutive rhetoric:" 
Both the lawyer and the lawyer's audience live in a world in which their 
language and community are not flXed and certain but fluid, constantly 
remade, as their possibilities and limits are tested. The law is an art of 
persuasion that creates the objects of its persuasion, for it constitutes 
both the community and the culture it commends. 
White, supra note 25, at 691; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 677, 690 (1999) (describing Michael Foucault as viewing the world as a 
"rhetorical structure," one that "possesses no antecedent order of its own, but 
acquires one only through the constitutive organizing power of 'words'"). 
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construct different views of what is true, what is reasonable. 
Part II considers the Court's shifting constructions of 
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search." It highlights 
that these shifting and conflicting views allow the Court to 
wander down many different roads when interpreting what 
constitutes a "search." For example, in 1987, Justice Scalia 
simply stated, "[a] search is a search,"32 but in 2001, he 
stated that doctrine should inform the Court "[i]n assessing 
when a search is not a search."33 Part III then examines the 
Court's application of its modern "search" definition in several 
contexts; Part IV highlights the Court's rhetorical devices for 
constructing a Fourth Amendment "search" in its most recent 
decision, Kyllo v. United States. 34 It demonstrates the 
importance of characterization in deciding cases and in 
shifting or synthesizing "search" paradigms. Postmodern 
perspectives aid us in understanding the Court's alleged 
jurisprudential "mess." Instead of despairing about the 
inconsistencies, the section suggests that these rhetorical 
devices, created by a varieties of legal communities, give the 
Court great flexibility to shape Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, whether to merely decide a pending case or to 
foreshadow (and later explicitly construct) a new paradigm for 
evaluating officials' use of emerging technologies. 
I. POSTMODERNISM THEMES 
Numerous definitions of "postmodernism" exist.35 Some 
32 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding officer's moving of 
equipment was search under Fourth Amendment). 
33 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (holding use of sense-
enhancing technology to gain information on interior of home was "search" under 
Fourth Amendment. 
,.. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27. 
"' See, e.g., Harris, supra note 4, at 748 (stating that "[t)here are as many 
different definitions of postmodernism as there are postmodernists"); Tracy E. 
Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodemism, and Justice, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1539 n.12 (1995) (noting that "[p)ostmodernism is a 
disputed term, one not susceptible to simple definition; and focusing on one im-
portant aspect of postmodernism-"postmodernism's denial that ideas exist apart 
from the practices in which they are embodied"); Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern 
Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 455, 456 (1991) (stating that 
2002] "SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 459 
scholars have identified three aspects of postmodernism. 36 
First, postmodernism is the time we live in;37 it is an histori-
cal period, one "originating just after World War II but gain-
ing momentum as the sixties approached. "38 Postmodernism 
first surfaced in the arts and included works by John Cage, 
William Faulkner, Phillip Glass, Edvard Munch, and Andy 
"[t)here are more than thirty-one flavors of postmodernism ... " and "the deci-
sion about what postmodernism is remains as fraught as ever-one reason why 
postmodernism can maintain its franchise and even set up new outposts on 
criticism's terrain"). Some scholars have described their works as a hybrid of 
modernism and postmodernism. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CluTIQUE OF ADJU-
DICATION: /fin de sieclel 17 (1997) (characterizing his writings as "left wing and 
modernistlpostmodernist"). 
ss See, e.g., LIToWITZ, supra note 4, at 7-19; Balkin, Postrnodern 
Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1967-72. Some scholars have created two 
broad categories-the historical and theoretical-to focus a discussion of what con-
stitutes postmodernism. See, e.g., Wicke, supra note 35, at 457 (referring to a 
"historical periodization where the postmodem genuinely described a convergence 
of historical phenomena" and "congeries of theoretical suppositions about the na-
ture of language, texts and human subjects within the lens of the social"). And 
others have created their own labels to describe these distinctions. See, e.g., 
James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and 
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 497 (1999) (stating postmodernism has two aspects: 
a "cultural schtick," which he labels "pomo," and an "earnest epistemology whose 
natural habitat is the Modem Language Association annual conference"). 
37 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM 
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 38 (2000) (stating 
that "postmodernism certainly is not over"). Professor Feldman believes that 
"postmodernism is best understood as an extant intellectual, cultural, and social 
era that, in fact, is still in its youth." I d.; see also TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLU-
SIONS OF POSTMODERNISM 20 (1996) (stating that "we are living in . . . 
postmodernism"); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 68 (1995) (stating that "[t)his generation, Genera-
tion X, belongs to a particular epoch, namely, that of postmodernism"); Balkin, 
Postrnodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1967 (arguing postmodernity is 
current cultural era); Lipkin, see supra note 23, at 332 (stating that the "present 
age is contingently regarded by many as the age of postmodernity"). See generally 
Schanck, supra note 23, at 2560 (noting the "absence of a general postmodem 
zeitgeist" and the lack of "widespread recognition that people's view of reality are 
social constructions"). For example, a search in Westlaw of the phrase 
"postmodem!" in the tp-all database gets intercepted by the company because it 
would result in too many citations, but a search of allfeds and allstates databases 
resulted in a total of only fourteen citations. (Search conducted June 27, 2002). 
But see Patterson, supra note 11, at 257 n.9 (stating that "[w)hether or not we 
are in postmodernity is, of course, very much open to question"). 
ss See LITOWITZ, supra note 4, at 8. 
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Warhol, to name a few. 39 These artists "stressed the break-
down of linear narrative" and "the rise of pastiche. >Ho Second, 
"postmodernism is also the set of cultural products created 
during the era of postmodernity, >Hl "such as film, television, 
fax machines, cable television, video and the Internet. >H2 
Third, postmodernism is a "set of general perspectives for 
interpreting and evaluating culture and the products of cul-
ture.>Hs Although these three levels in part explore new 
boundaries, postmodern legal interpretation theory has fo-
cused on how different communities construct different bound-
aries or perspectives. As a result, multiplicity is a strong 
theme within postmodernism as a philosophy, but not within 
one's circle.44 As one scholar aptly noted, "[a] postmodern phi-
losophy does not---eannot-lead to a postmodern way of life>H5 
because within our own circle we do not embrace this multi-
plicity. Many scholars have attempted to describe this 
postmodern philosophical perspective by constructing different 
themes for postmodernism and modernism.46As the language 
suggests, postmodernity follows modernity.47 Modernism's 
•• See, e.g., L!Towrrz, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that movement began "just 
after World War II but gaining momentum as the sixties approached); see Wicke, 
supra note 35, at 458-59. 
40 L!ToWITL, supra note 4, at 8. 
" Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1969. 
•
2 Douglas Litowitz, In Defense of Postmodernism, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 41 
(2000) (arguing postmodernism can be understood on three corresponding levels); 
see also Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1969. But see 
Boyle, supra note 36, at 497 n.6 (rejecting communications developments as an 
aspect of postmodernism, but agreeing as to the arts forms that emerged). 
.. Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1971. 
" See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2560 (stating that "simply because 
intellectuals may believe that truth is contingent and local does not mean that 
most people do"). 
.. Schanck, supra note 23, at 2560 . 
.., See, e.g., L!Towrrz, supra note 4, at 10-17 (using contrasting quotations 
from postmodernist and modernist writers to highlight different perspectives); 
Schanck, supra note 23, at 2507 (describing postmodernism as the "prevailing 
paradigm" "underlying critical legal studies"). 
•• See, e.g., JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN EXPLAINED: CORRE-
SPONDENCE 1982-1985 12-13 (1993). Lyotard answered the question "What then is 
the postmodem?," with a paradox: "A work can become modem only if it is first 
postmodem. Thus, understood, postmodernism in not modernism at its end, but in 
a nascent state, and ~ state is recurrent." I d. He further added, 
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time frame spanned from "mid-Enlightenment to the 1960s 
and early 1970s.»t8 Modernism represented a belief in a foun-
dation, one that "would support and constrain judicial 
decisionm.aking. »49 With respect to constitutional interpreta-
tion, modernism represented a belief that by using reason, we 
would be able to ascertain objective principles-to "discover the 
correct constitutional methodology."50 In addition, modernism 
believed in "the existence of a neutral and objective faculty of 
reason which can be used to generate first principles of moral-
ity and law. "51 
Scholars have identified several general intellectual stag-
es of modernism. 52 In the first stage, lawyers and courts re-
"Postnuxlernism would be understanding according to the paradox of the future 
(post) anterior (modo)." ld. at 15. 
48 LrroWITL, supra note 4, at 7; see also Schanck, supra note 23, at 2575 
(noting that legal realists "presaged postmodernism by rejecting legal formalism," 
but that not until the 1970s with the Critical Legal Studies movement did 
"postmodernism concepts again become highly visible"). But see Patterson, supra 
note 11, at 256 n.9 (stating that "[m)odernity is that period in human history 
which begins with the Enlightment and continues to the present"). 
•• See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 37, at 224-25 (stating that "modernity charac-
terizes the view of traditional jurisprudential scholars who shared a common 
belief in the possibility of systematizing legal knowledge using coherent and veri-
fiable propositions about the nature of law and adjudication"); Robert L. Hayman, 
Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postnuxlern Constitutional 
Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 59 n.5 (1995) (discussing the defi-
nition of postmodernism). Professor Hayman has noted that even though 
postmodernism "remains a very loose pastiche of ideas-the discourse is multi-
dimensional, multi-directional, and largely unbounded"-it nevertheless calls "into 
question modernism's central beliefs in rationality, autonomy, progress, and self-
awareness." ld.; see also Higgins, supra note 35, at 1539 n.9 (defining 
'"modernism' loosely as a form of thought that seeks to create a general theory 
about the representation of nature in the mind" and adding that the "modernist 
or foundationalist theory of representation provides a cross-cultural and trans-
historical account of truth and rationality that in turn serves as a basis for social 
criticism"). 
50 Lipkin, supra note 23, at 321. Lipkin also stated that the "hallmark of the 
modern age was the commitment to reason, science, ethics, and more generally, 
the conviction that these disciplines reflected an independent reality." Lipkin, 
supra note 23, at 328. 
61 LrroWITL, supra note 4, at 10. 
02 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 22-28 (describing four stages of mod-
ernism: "rationalism," "empiricism," "transcendentalism," and "late crisis"); MINDA, 
supra note 37, at 13-80. Professor Minda has created numerous categories for 
modernism, marking 1871, as the beginning of American modern jurisprudence, 
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jected natural law as a foundation for decisions.53 Instead of 
looking to churches or the King for knowledge, 54 they looked 
to positivism and viewed· law as a science after the Civil 
War.55 Law was "a transcendent object or transcendent sub-
ject, unaffected by social and economic context. "56 In the sec-
ond stage, American legal realism occurred, which "turned to 
experience as the source of objectivity,"away from the belief 
that "abstract rules could disclose legal truths. "57 Legal pro-
with the publication of the first contracts casebook, MINDA, supra note 37, at 13; 
the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, MINDA, supra note 37, at 25; 
the Legal Process movement of 1940s and 1950s, which tried to explain "how 
respect for procedure and principled decision making might lead judges to out-
comes that conform to institutional and democratic norms," MINDA, supra note 37, 
at 34; the "neutral principles" of the 1960s, MINDA, supra note 37, at 37; "norma-
tive legal thought" of the post-1960s, MINDA, supra note 37, at 57. 
•• See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 269 n.68 (noting that "premodern 
categories" were "religious authority[] and cosmology-an understanding of the 
world that explains the existence of the universe by postulating the existence of a 
deity"). 
.. See also Lipkin, supra note 23, at 326. Professor Lipkin has noted that in 
the pre-modern era "[o)ne had the right to proclaim knowledge only when one's 
position in society so permitted" and that "the word of the Pope or King, or their 
representative was law." Lipkin, supra note 23, at 326. He explained that the 
ability to declare knowledge depended not on an individual's intellectual inquiry, 
but rather on "membership in particular groups, such as the church, the crown, 
the aristocracy, guilds, and other associations." Lipkin, supra note 23, at 326 . 
.. FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 83-105. See also Patterson, supra note 11, at 
263 n.41 (stating that "[i)f any single theme runs through the whole of modernity 
it is the idea of autonomy," adding that "in politics, the subject is free to decide 
her own conception of the good; in the art, the work of art must be allowed to 
'speak for itself"). 
•• MINDA, supra note 37, at 14. 
"
1 FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 113. Other scholars have described differently 
this period, labeling the legal science and legal realist movements as "marginal 
academic movements." For example, Professor Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg 
have characterized different stages within their categories of "Progressive Interpre-
tation" and the "Crisis of Progressive Interpretation." See BINDER & WEISBERG, 
supra note 11, at 56-111. Binder and Weisberg noted, 
Morton Horwitz has defmed Legal Realism broadly as including any at-
tack on legal science (variously characterized as legal orthodoxy or classi-
cal legal thought) in the name of Progressive social policy. . . . Since we 
see legal science as an aspect of, or at most a dialectical moment in, the 
evolution of Progressive legal thought, we fmd this defmition ultimately 
unhelpful. It amounts to building an ideologically and epistemologically 
purified Progressivism by projecting much of its conservative, technocratic, 
and elitist currents onto a fictively coherent opponent. This evades the 
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cess theory developed during the third stage, which believed 
in "right" answers to legal questions, rejecting legal realism's 
embracing of legal indeterminacy.58 Legal process theorists 
studied institutions and their competencies. 59 In the final 
stage, crisis occurred, with some scholars characterizing it as 
the "Age of Anxiety." At this time, contemporary social prob-
lems seemed no longer addressed by law's authority; for some, 
"the authority of the law was seen as part of the problem. JJ60 
Many scholars still vehemently (and at times acrimonious-
ly)61 debate what we mean by the labels "modernist" and 
"postmodernist.JJS2 Even though postmodernism "is neither a 
challenge of understanding how ideas that today seem antithetical could 
have coexisted in the same discourses, the same social circles, and the 
same minds. We think it better to treat Legal Science and Legal Realism 
as necessarily marginal academic movements, illuminating sideshows to 
and rhetorical hypertrophies of mainstream legal thought. 
Id. at 81 n.288. 
68 See MINDA, supra note 37, at 34. 
59 See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 37, at 34-35; FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 121 
(stating the legal process theorists contended that "reasoned elaboration meaning-
fully constrain[ed] judges in ways that executive officers, legislators, and adminis-
trators [were] not constrained"). 
110 MINDA, supra note 37, at 66. See also FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 126 
(stating that stage was "characterized by deeply inconsistent attitudes and pro-
jects-anxiety, despair, anger, denunciations, and increasingly complex modernist 
solutions that seized upon a combinations of rationalism, empiricism, and tran-
scendentalism"). 
81 See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and the 
Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997) (using 
"newspeak" and satire to capture the author's view that postmodernism has noth-
ing to offer to any one, and ironically not defining "modernism" in this mammoth 
article). For an excellent (and readable) response, see Stephen Feldman, supra 
note 37, at 2362 (rejecting the view that postmodernism is tied to "nihilism, ide-
alism, [and] relativism"); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Legal Scholarship 
at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 TEx. L. REv. 321, 325 
(1998) (hypothesizing reasons for Arrow to write (and the law review's decision to 
publish) a 228-page parody). 
82 See, e.g., john a. powell, The Multiple Self· Exploring Between and Beyond 
Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1505 (1997) (ironically 
noting that a "number of writers have suggested that postmodernism derives from 
and depends on modernism and that the very attempt to disprove modernism is 
based on modernist assumptions"). Even self-described postmodernists have ironi-
cally noted that by labeling a period as "modernism" or "postmodernism" one is 
not expressing a postmodernist's perspective because postmodernism is anti-
essentialism; yet, because postmodernism is also rooted in paradoxes and irony, 
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theory nor a concept, m;s some scholars have nevertheless at-
tempted to construct broad themes describing postmodernism, 
recognizing that their perspectives would necessarily lay the 
groundwork for both criticism and contradiction. 64 Some of 
one may still characterize modernism and postmodernism. See, e.g., FELDMAN, 
supra note 37, at 40-41. 
aa MINDA, supra note 37, at 224 (stating that postmodernism is "a skeptical 
attitude or aesthetic" that rejects grand theories and the belief in a "complete and 
coherent" legal system); see also Schanck, supra note 23, at 2597 (stating that 
"the practice of theory is a perfectly legitimate activity from a postmodem per-
spective, but not if it attempts to guide practices from an Olympian perspective"). 
"' See, e.g., EAGLETON, supra note 37, at vii (defming "postmodernity" as "a 
style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity 
and objectivity, of the idea of universal progress or emancipation, of single frame-
works, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation"); FELDMAN, supra 
note 37, at 44 (referring to the "pastiche of postmodem practices" after describing 
eight themes of postmodernism: the rejection of foundations and essentialism, id. 
at 163; the rejection of certainties, and boundaries, id. at 166; the recognizing of 
numerous paradoxes, id. at 169; the "focus on power and its manifold manifesta-
tions," id. at 169; the "social construction of the self or subject," id. at 174; the 
analysis of a postmodernist's own orientation, id. at 179; the "use of irony," id. at 
180; and political "ambivalence," id. at 181; LITowrrz, supra note 4, at 10-19 
(describing themes of postmodernism: rejecting the idea of objective reason; view-
ing "human behavior" as "socially constructed"; believing that "truth is construct-
ed, changing, and affected by the distorting influences of class, race, and gender"; 
rejecting "self-evident principles of justice and natural law"; believing that texts 
have multiple meanings and "no ultimate meaning"; rejecting the notion of history 
reflecting "moral progress"; and recognizing the difficulty and irony of using lan-
guage to challenge modernist perspectives"); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC 
SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 4-5 (1997) 
(viewing the themes of postmodernism as including the following: '"a conviction 
that no single a priori thought system should govern belief"; the world forms 
'"the background and condition of every cognitive actm; "'[a]ll human understand-
ing is interpretation, and no interpretation is finalm; in discerning truth and reali-
ty, a person '"can never presume to transcend the manifold predispositions of his 
or her subjectivicym; and '"all meaning [of a text] is ultimately undecidablem) 
(quoting RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING 
THE IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD VIEW 95-99 (1991)); Schanck, supra 
note 23, at 2508 (describing the following themes as interrelated: the self is 
"purely a social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation"; because there are no 
foundational principles, "certainty as the result of either empirical verification or 
deductive reasoning is impossible"; "[t]here can be no such thing as knowledge of 
reality"; "all propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social 
constructions"). See generally BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 
231 n.18 (2d 1999) (listing five general themes of postmodernism: "rejecting the 
idea of a foundational or transcendent source for truth or justification;" "rejecting 
the notion of determinate unique meanings or statements, texts, or events;" as-
serting "that truth and identity are socially constructed or culturally constructed;" 
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these broad-brushed themes provide an excellent horizon for 
scrutinizing the Supreme Court's multiple constructions of 
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search," as later dis-
cussed in Parts 11-IV. 
One important theme of postmodernism is the rejection of 
foundations, which discards the idea of a singular Truth. 65 In 
contrast to modernism, which viewed reason as the avenue to 
objectivity, 66 postmodernism does not see this road. Instead, 
it sees multiple roads ahead because multiple communities 
compose our society and each one has its own "truth.J>S7 
rejecting grand narratives (e.g., seeing history as a movement towards ever great-
er rationality or ever greater liberty, or seeing law as a movement 'from status to 
contract')"; and emphasizing "the irrational or unconscious influences on action 
and belief'). For a discussion of these authors' themes, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 65-71. 
65 See, e.g., LITOWITZ, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that "postmodernists are 
skeptical about the notion of a flxed Truth (with a capital letter)" and quoting 
Michael Foucault, Truth and Power, in PoWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, 133 (Colin Gordon et al. trans. & ed., New 
York Pantheon 1980) ("'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it. A 'regime' of truth"); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF 
REAsoN 144 (1998) ("What is called reason these days is very often not. Very 
often 'reason' is little more than a pleasant name for faith, dogma, prejudice, and 
company."); Francis J. Mootz, The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholar· 
ship, 31 Hous. L. REv. 873, 885 (1994) (stating that •antifoundational accounts of 
the rule of law . . . emphasize that the law never operates outside the context of 
wider social struggles to defme the terms of sociopolitical organization"); see also 
LITOWITZ, supra note 4, at 9-10 (stating that postmodernists reject the "notion 
that the just state can be founded upon flrst principles" and that they "deny the 
existence of a neutral and objective faculty of reason which can be used to gener-
ate first principles of morality and law"). See generally Schanck, supra note 23, at 
2559 (stating that the "factor that would transform the nature of the human 
condition from modern to postmodern is a general sense that all knowledge is 
contingent and that the truth is subject to context"). 
88 See, e.g., Lipkin, supra note 23, at 328 (stating that modernism viewed 
reason and science as the means to "reveal the complete truth about physical and 
moral reality"); Patterson, supra note 11, at 266 (stating that "knowledge on the 
modernist view is foundational, whether derived from rationalism or empiricism," 
but noting that language may be representational but that "truth" does not apply 
to "moral judgments"). 
67 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRIT-
ICAL THEORY AND THE ENDS OF PHll..OSOPHY 178 (1990). Norris has criticized 
postmodernists for believing that "all theories, truth-claims, ethical principles, etc., 
must be construed in terms of some given consensus or 'interpretive community.'" 
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Postmodernism contends that "[h]uman knowledge is the his-
torically contingent product of linguistic and social practices of 
particular local communities of interpreters, with no assured 
'ever-closer' relation to an independent ahistorical reality.~ 
Postmodernism rejects the idea of an objective truth, an objec-
tive historical narrative,69 an objective "X."70 In short, 
postmodernism "challenges the possibility of grounding reason 
Id. As a result, postmodernists would continue debating, but realize that "(at 
some level) that there were no ultimate truths to be had, no ground-rules or 
principles beyond those offered by the range of currently available beliefs." I d.; see 
also Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
31 (1997) (stating "the image of the consumer as someone induced from outside to 
enter the circle of liberal justification is wrong. In many important senses, the 
consumer is already within the circles of liberal justification"). 
68 TAMANAHA, supra note 64, at 4 (quoting RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF 
THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD 
VIEW 95-99 (1991)). 
69 For an excellent, in-depth analysis of shifting constructions of history in 
constitutional law, see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional 
Scholarship 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002). Professor White has noted that 
interpreters' claim to historical "objectivity" represents their belief that past is 
separate from the present. Id. at 492. In contrast, when interpreters view the 
present as linked to the past, their view "undermines a strong belief in historical 
objectivity." I d. at 493. For White, even when "present actors" view their circum-
stances different from the past, they cannot claim history to be "entirely 
'irrelevant' to their existence." Id. at 614. He views them as acting "with the 
weight of their immediate past pressing upon them." ld.; see also Thomas Y. 
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of 
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine, in Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 246 (2002). Professor Thomas Davies has 
vehemently attacked the Court's perspective historical analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment in Atwater, which held that an officer acted reasonably when con-
ducting a warrantless custodial arrest for minor offense. He stated that the 
Court's "supposed historical analysis consisted almost entirely of rhetorical ploys 
and distortions of historical sources." Id. He also claimed that the Court "omitted" 
historical sources that are "plainly inconsistent with framing-era doctrine." I d. at 
246-47. Although a postmodernist would view such conflicting constructions of 
history as inevitable, the sharp contrast between Professor Davies' historical per-
spective and the Court's perspective highlights the role of rhetorical devices in 
constructing an historical argument. 
70 See, e.g., LITOWI'I"L, supra note 4, at 34-35 (stating that postmodernism 
rejects the "foundational concepts" of "neutrality, justice, reason, history, nature, 
the social contract, God, the rational self, and the inherent autonomy of the indi-
vidual"; adding that "postmodernism is characteristically critical, seeking to expose 
the foundations of modem jurisprudence as constructs or ideologies which parade 
as eternal verities"). 
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in anything other than actual social practices. "71 
Another way to describe postmodernism's rejection of 
foundations is to consider the term "antiessentialism."72 
Essentialism has a core 73; antiessentialism has no static core. 
As a result, the postmodernist contends that any paradigm 
attempting to capture the essence of a doctrine or a person's 
identity necessarily reflects its own particular community's 
view, not the view of all communities.74 
71 Lipkin, supra note 23, at 329. 
n See, e.g., powell, supra note 62, at 1484 (stating that the "tensions between 
modernism and postmodernism are often framed in terms of essentialism and 
antiessentialism" and arguing that resolving this tension is not necessary to un-
derstand "intersectionalism's claim of a decentered nonunitary self"). 
•• See, e.g., Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dis-
mantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995) (defming 
essentialism as "the notion that there is a single woman's, or Black person's, or 
any other group's experience that can be described as independently from other 
aspects of the person-that there is an 'essence' to that experience"); Note, Patriar-
chy is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of A Postrnodern Account of Gen-
der, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1973, 1973 (1995) (defining and criticizing essentialism's 
search to fmd to "common trait that unites all women and constitutes a core of a 
universal female identity"); see also IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
WHAT! 16 (1999) (stating that "[v]ery often essentialism is a crutch for racism"). 
Professor Hacking explained what "essentialism" means as applied to race: 
I d. 
[E]ssentialism is an especially strong form of background assumption. . . . 
If a person's race is an essential element of a person's being, then race is 
not inevitable only in the present state of affairs. It is inevitable, period, 
so long as there are human beings .... Essentialists (usually more im-
plicit than explicit in their beliefs) hold that one's race is part of one's 
essence, 
•• See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for 
Equality, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3 (2000). Professor Nan Hunter has de-
scribed the antiessentialist perspective of postmodernism when considering the 
construction of identity: 
Postmodernist politics rejected both the modernist themes of individual 
autonomy and universal values, as well as the belief that identity politics 
claims were necessarily liberatory. The postmodern critique of identity 
politics asked: if identity claims are to be legitimate, who among the 
group gets to formulate and voice the substance of such claims? 
Antiessentia!ists caveats tc easy notions of a unitary conception, for exam-
ple, of "woman," or a single narrative or women's life experiences, compli-
cated theories of equality. Postmodernism functioned in many respects as 
a dissent against certain features of identity politics, challenging identity 
orthodoxy and suggesting that overreliance on concepts like personhood 
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The difference between modernism's essentialism and 
postmodernism's antiessentialism was expressed in the con-
trasting views of feminists. Some early modernists feminists 
attempted to describe "woman" "by a preconceived and limited 
set of abstract characteristics, perspectives, or interests."75 
Essentialist theory failed because "it picked one pebble and 
asked it to represent all" women.76 Later postmodern femi-
nists challenged essentialism, contending that the studied 
"pebble" failed to include "women of color, lesbians, and poor 
women. "77 They proposed the theory of an "intersectional 
self,"78 which was composed of multiple, contradictory selves 
that would arise depending upon the particular context.79 In 
short, later feminists saw the self as fractured, "relational and 
fluid," and "strongly linked to context."80 
causes as many problems as it solves. Often this strain of criticism took 
the form of further specification of unrecognized identities. 
Id.; see also powell, supra note 62, at 1497 (stating that postmodernists "tend to 
agree with the notion of the self as relational and fluid-dependent upon the con-
text in which it exists"). 
75 FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 160. 
78 Grillo, supra note 73, at 21. 
77 Id. (citing, inter alia, Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585-602 (1990); AUDRE LoRDE, SISTER OUT-
SIDER 110-13 (1984)); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as 
Feminist Metlwd, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL 'y & L. 31, 32 n.5 (2000) (collect-
ing works that described the numerous approaches to feminism, including "equali-
ty stage," "difference stage," and "diversity stage," linking the latter to 
postmodernism). 
78 See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 73, at 18 (rejecting the idea that the "situation 
of Black women is the composite of the situations of white women and Black 
men"; explaining that "we all stand at multiple intersections of our fragmented 
legal selves"); see also powell, supra note 62, at 1495-96 (relating the concept of 
intersectional self to postmodernism's view of a fractured and multiple seiO. 
79 powell, supra note 62, at 1495. 
80 powell, supra note 62, at 1497. Professor Grillo described well how we ex-
perience these multiple selves: 
Each of us in the world sits at the intersection of many categories: She is 
Latina, woman, short, mother, lesbian, daughter, brown-eyed, long-haired, 
quick-witted, short-tempered, worker, stubborn. At any one moment in 
time and in space, some of these categories are central to her being and 
her ability to act in the world. Others matter not at all. Some categories, 
such as race, gender, class, and sexual orientation, are important most of 
the time. Others are rarely important. When something or someone high-
lights one of her categories and brings it to the fore, she may be a domi-
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Echoing this antiessentialism perspective is "outsider" or 
"other" jurisprudence. 81 This jurisprudence describes a person 
as an "other" when she feels "fragmented by society's domi-
nant discourse."82 As one scholar has noted, "[T]he experience 
of otherness ... exists across time and culture as the inevita-
ble product of social organization. "83 This jurisprudence has 
contended that those individuals who possessed power con-
structed legal doctrines from their own perspective, failing to 
question how other communities would view these doc-
trines.84 The product of this power was a "legal system [that] 
has consistently functioned to create and perpetuate the privi-
nant person, an oppressor of others. Other times, even most of the time, 
she may be oppressed herself. She may take lessons she has learned 
while in a subordinated status and apply them for good or ill when her 
dominant categories are highlighted. For example, having been mistreated 
as a child, she may be either a carefully respectful or an abusive parent. 
Grillo, supra note 73, at 17; see also Patterson, supra note 11, at 257 n.9 (stating 
that "postmodernism poses a threat to any form of feminist critique that issues 
from a perspective assuming or presupposing a position outside the (dominant) 
discourse of (gendered) law"). 
81 For an excellent collection of articles in this genre, see CRITICAL RAcE THE-
ORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). 
82 powell, supra note 62, at 1491. Professor Powell has illustrated how one 
becomes an "other" by relating the story of a young girl, who first lived in a 
"Negro town" until age 13, and became a "little colored girl" when she went to 
school with white children. powell, supra note 62, at 1492 (quoting Zora Neale 
Hurston, How It Feels to be Colored Me, in I LoVE MYSELF WHEN I AM LAUGH-
ING 152-53 (Alice Walker ed., 1979). 
83 Samuel A Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 
688 (2001). 
N See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 5, at 2374 (arguing that "we cannot under-
stand how constitutional doctrine should be organized until we understand how 
society is organized"). Professor Jack Balkin has recognized the need for constitu-
tional interpretation to recognize our diverse communities: 
[We need] to look carefully at the structure of the society in which we 
live, to identify social stratification where it exists, and to recognize the 
possible connections between the moral justifications that majorities offer 
and the preservation of their superior status . . . . Social hierarchies 
appear in many forms and degrees: We should not imagine that there is 
a single test or a single clause of the Constit"...ttion that can deal with all 
of them fully and adequately. 
Balkin, supra note 5, at 2374; see also Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on 
the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 117, 129-30 (2001) (proposing rules for 
police officers in conducting traffic stops to check their bias against minorities). 
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lege of White males"85 Outsider scholarship has reflected 
postmodernism's view of multiple communities by critically 
examining the privilege that whites and males have in soci-
ety.86 In addition, to discern this outsider or other, 
postmodernists have deconstructed texts.87 
Resonating with the themes of antifoundationalism, 
antiessentialism and outsider jurisprudence is 
postmodernism's embracing of social construction theor18 or 
"constructionism."89 Under this theory, how we perceive the 
86 powell, supra note 62, at 1483. 
86 See CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LoOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard 
Delgado and Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) for an excellent collection of articles exam-
ining the privileges that whites and males possess in our society. See Balkin, 
supra note 5, at 2321 (highlighting that "[c)ritical race scholars have repeatedly 
noted that white Americans have certain status privileges conferred on them 
merely by being white"). See generally Schanck, supra note 23, at 2588 n.331 
(describing that some feminists adopting postmodem perspectives may sense an 
undermining of their "feminist goal of portraying male chauvinism as unalterably 
evil in nature;" stating that this conflict arises from their suspending "judgment 
about behavior in an effort to relate to or connect with others and to empathize 
with them"). 
87 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1994) (describing deconstruction's furthering justice 
by allowing communication with the outsider or other). See also Patterson, supra 
note 11, at 272-73: 
Postmodem approaches to language do not present arguments against the 
modem, representationalist view. Rather, postmodernist conceptions of the 
word-world relation see the modernist picture of propositional, representa-
tional truth as unintelligible-as a project that never gets off the ground. 
The focus of the dispute is the modernist theory of correspondence, specif-
ically, the Sentence-Truth-World relation. To put it in a nutshell, the 
postmodem alternative replaces the modernist picture of Sentence-Truth-
World with an account of understanding that emphasizes practice, war-
ranted assertability, and pragmatism. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
88 See, e.g., Lrrowrrz, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that postmodernists "assert 
that the self is a product of language and discourse, that it is 'decentered' . . . 
and that there is no core self'; adding that "postmodernists tend to hold that 
human behavior is socially constructed, molded by tradition and practices"). See 
generally HACKING, supra note 73, at 7 (stating that "[u)ndoubtedly the most 
influential social construction doctrines have had to do with gender"). 
89 HACKING, supra note 73, at 39. Philosopher Ian Hacking fmds redundant 
the phrase "social construction." HACKING, supra note 73, at 39 (stating that 
"[m]ost items said to be socially constructed could be constructed only socially, if 
they are constructed at all"; recommending using "social" only for "emphasis or 
contrast"). Because of his dissatisfaction with the phrase and its overuse, Hacking 
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"self' or a "subject" depends upon a person's particular com-
mUnity, its "social structures and cultural symbols.mlll A per-
son does not have an "essence;,g1 nor does she choose her 
own ideology, but rather her community provides the "frame-
work" for her choices.92 
In attempting to limit or frame social construction theory, 
philosopher Ian Hackin~3 has argued that three aspects rep-
resent the "starting point" of social construction theory: (1) 
"the existence or character of X is not determined by the na-
ture of things;" (2) "X is not inevitable;" and (3) "X was 
brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces histo-
ry, all of which could well have well been different. "94 Ideas, 
theories and laws are obvious examples of social construction 
has recommended using the word "constructionism." HACKING, supra note 73, at 
48. 
90 FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 174; see also Marcosson, supra note 83, at 684 
(noting that "there is widespread acceptance of the premise that concepts of self 
are culture-dependent"). Professor Samuel Marcosson has linked self-concept to 
cultural experiences by relying on the works of cognitive psychologists and sociolo-
gists: 
[T]he very notion of self-understanding as affected by cultural context 
understates the importance of context: "the very core of self-understanding 
is constructed through, and reflects on, social interactions. Rather than 
understanding the self in cultural context or situating the self in interper-
sonal space, we argue for understanding the self as a social-cultural pro-
cess. 
Marcosson, supra note 83, at 683-84 (quoting Robyn Fivush & Janine Buckner, The 
Self as Socially Constructed: A Commentary, in THE CONCEPI'UAL SELF lN CONTEXT 
176 (Urlric Neisser & David Jopling eds., 1997). 
91 FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 175. 
92 FELOMAN, supra note 37, at 174; see also Marcosson, supra note 83, at 687 
(describing the labels "masculine" and "feminine" as social constructs and noting 
that "some traits or roles might be (and often are) masculine in one culture and 
feminine in another"). But see Todd Zywicki, Evoluntionary Psyclwlogy and the 
Social Sciences, 13 HUMANE STUD. REV. 1, 'I 10 (2000), available at http:!/ 
libertyguide.orgllibertyguide/hsrlhsr/phpl36.html (rejecting the tabula rasa theory, 
the idea of "blank personalities subject to molding by social, cultural, legal, politi-
cal, and economic forces economic focus theory," as "Darwinism from the neck up" 
(citing Todd J. Zywicki, The Nature of the State and the State of Nature: A Com-
;r.er.t on. Grady and lrfcGuire, 1 J. BIOECONOMICS, 241 (1999). 
'"' See HACKING, supra note 73, at 19 (stating sarcastically that "[s]ocial con-
struct is code for not universal, not part of pan-cultural human nature, and don't 
tread on me with those heavy hegemonic [racist, patriarchal] boots of yours"). 
,.. HACKING, supra note 73, at 6-7. 
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because we easily discem that a particular society shaped 
them, for example, the cultural view of what constitutes "child 
abuse, "95 legal requirements for citizenship96 or the estab-
lishing of a speed limit on a highway.97 What social construc-
tion theory is about is describing the areas that people do not 
easily perceive as socially created.98 For example, social con-
struction theory has examined race,99 gender, identity and 
the idea of objective reason, viewing these as products of our 
culture. 100 Under this theory, Hacking discems six different 
911 See, e.g., HACKING, supra note 73, at 146 (stating that "a great deal of 
behavior that we hold intrinsically loathsome and terribly harmful to children is 
merely venial or even encouraged in other cultures"; and adding that "[c)hild 
abuse, as diagnostic and political concept, has chiefly been a phenomenon of the 
English-speaking world; with the United States as almost the only source of con-
ceptual innovation"); J. Robert Shull, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse: 
Notes on Discourse, History, and Change, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1665, 1697 (1999) 
(describing the legal concept of child abuse as moving from a medical perspective 
to perspectives embraced by "psychologists and sociologists"). 
96 Marcosson, supra note 83, at 688-89 (describing citizenship as a social con-
struct, one rooted in "political, social, historical, legal, and econolnic forces on 
geography"). 
97 See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Law as Interpretation, 76 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 
779, 781 (2000) (stating that "without our current, contingent mix of legal practic-
es and institutions, there would be no such thing as a speed lilnit at all"). 
98 See HACKING, supra note 73, at 12 (stating that "[i)f "everybody knows that 
X is the contingent upshot of social arrangements, there is no point in saying 
that it is socially constructed"). Social construction theory may unmask that which 
is hidden. HACKING, supra note 73, at 20. 
99 See, e.g., NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 1 (1995) (rejecting 
biology as a means to identify race by describing the following "absurdit[y]": "a 
white woman can give birth to a black child, but a black woman can never give 
birth to a white child"; adding that "people are members of different races be-
cause they have been assigned to them"); Daniel G. Blackburn, Why Race Is Not 
a Biological Concept, in RACE & RACISM IN THEORY & PRACTICE 3, 7 (Berel Lang 
ed., 2000) (rejecting the biological construction of race, claiming that it is as reli-
able as referring to "a genetic background that is 'Californian,' 'Episcopalian,' or 
'Republicanm); Jane Maslow Cohen, Race-Based Adoption in a Post-Loving Frame, 
6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 653, 669 (1997) (noting that social construction theory views 
the "indeterlninacy of race," with "interracial marriage and interracial reproduc-
tion ... intilnidating the concept of race"); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Con-
struction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994) (defining "race" as "a vast group of people 
loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of 
their morphology an/or ancestry" and stating that "race must be understood as a 
sui generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning serve as 
the connections between physical features, races, and personal characteristics"). 
100 See, e.g., HACKING, supra note 73, at 33 (viewing social constructionists as 
2002] "SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 473 
uses of social construction theory: to reflect interest in history, 
to be ironic, to either reform or unmask society's beliefs, to 
rebel or to revolt. 101 Ironically, postmodernism itself is a so-
cial construction. 102 
Social construction theory is also intertwined with anoth-
er postmodern theme-the view that texts have multiple mean-
ings because different communities construe them. 103 For the 
postmodernist, "meaning is determined by the interpretative 
conventions of the community."104 Because society has many 
different communities, we will have multiple constructions, 
whether of texts, identities or social norms. 105 Many of 
postmodernism's themes have roots in the perception of multi-
believing that "classifications are not determined by how the world is, but are 
convenient ways in which to represent it"); Lrrowrrz, supra note 4, at 11 (stating 
that postmodernists would argue that "reason is not a uniform faculty of all hu-
mankind but rather is socially constructed; it is always situated within existing 
practices ·and discourses, and it will therefore be biased or slanted in favor of 
existing power relations"). 
101 HACKING, supra note 73, at 33. 
1
0'J See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2581 (stating that postmodernists rec-
ognize that their positions are socially constructed). 
103 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 274 (stating that the "postmodem 
approach to language eschews advancing explanations in favor of describing local-
ized linguistic practices"); Schanck, supra note 23, at 2514 (stating that 
postmodernism attracts both right-wing as well as left-wing ideals). Professor 
Schanck has linked "two strains"-poststructuralism and neopragmatism-which, 
though different, share a common view of language because of social construction 
theory. Schanck, supra note 23, at 2514. Poststructuralism emphasizes "the role of 
language and language's underlying structures in shaping our understandings of 
reality and texts," and "neopragmatism emphasizes the social construction of 
knowledge and language." Schanck, supra note 23, at 2514. Schanck has noted 
the paradox of poststructuralism's view that "there is nothing outside of the text" 
and neopramatism's view "that there is no text," other than the one we create 
"through our preexisting, socially derived interpretations." Schanck, supra note 23, 
at 2515 (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak trans., 1976). He has characterized the link as rooted in social construc-
tion theory: "[o)ur perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically con-
ditioned, that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our 
knowledge depends on our different situations." Schnack, supra note 23, at 2515. 
104 See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2547. 
1011 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 165 (stating that "the Other refers 
not only to suppressed textual meanings but also to marginalized and subjugated 
individuals and groups (outgroups)-those individuals and groups whose meanings 
(or voices) are obscured or ignored"). 
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plicity because postmodernism discerns communities creating 
different constructions. Postmodernism rejects a "true" inter-
pretation of a text, 106 just as it rejects a "true" foundation for 
legal analysis, or a "true" view of gender107 or identity.108 
As a result, when a postmodernist reads a text, the restraints 
on interpretation arise from the community's conventions. For 
example, when interpreting law, judges employ the conven-
tions of the legal profession.109 These conventions reflect a 
particular community's passions and prejudices. 110 In addi-
tion, each community will perceive that it discerned "the cor-
rect and appropriate standards, not just one arbitrary set 
among many acceptable alternatives. "m In the end, "the in-
tricate concepts and methodologies of deconstruction are them-
selves only social. constructions, with no more right to privi-
106 Schanck, supra note 23, at 2547 (stating that because "[t)here can be no 
single correct interpretation of any text," there is also no single correct evaluation 
of "the practices, goals, morals, values, and norms of any institution or communi-
ty"). 
107 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 295 (stating that "[p)ostmodernism's 
singular contribution to feminism has been to raise the stakes in the sameness-
difference debate"). Professor Patterson has examined the work of postmodernist 
Ziallah Eisenstein and noted that "all questions of difference are simply a matter 
of one's own view" and that "their significance must remain open-textured." Id. at 
297 (quoting ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 35 (1988)). 
108 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 276-77 (stating that postmodernism 
"challenges the primacy of the individual"; postmodernism "casts the individual 
not as the subject in control of discourse, but as an artifact produced by dis-
course"). 
109 See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2545-46; see also Pierre Schlag, Clerks 
in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053, 2054 (1993) (noting that "[j)udges must 
destroy the worlds of meaning that others have constructed" and that they used 
the traditional '"rules,' 'doctrines,' and 'principlesm to mask their "highly self-inter-
ested constructions"). 
110 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 165 (stating that "(w]henever we 
understand a text from within our own horizon-which is the only way to under-
stand a text-we necessarily deny potential meanings that might arise from some 
other perspective or horizon"); Brice R. Wacheterhauser, Prejudice and Reason, in 
HATRED, BIGOTRY, AND PREJuDICE: DEFINlTIONS, CAUSES, AND SOLUTIONS 155, 157 
(1999) (stating that "the role of prejudice in cognition seems to render the ideal 
of a fully explicit procedure impossible to achieve" because "an implicit element is 
always involved inexorably in any method"). See generally Schanck, supra note 23, 
at 2556 n.209 (noting that "multiculturalism . . . involves a recognition that vari-
ous racial and ethnic groups constitute different interpretative communities with 
different assumptions, conventions, and implicit values"). 
m Schanck, supra note 23, at 2548. 
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leged status than any other."112 
These broad themes of postmodernism emphasize the 
ever-shifting role communities play in creating society. They 
highlight how communities construct foundations that reflect 
their particular viewpoints, from creating (or ignoring) race as 
a type of identity to interpretive principles for examining laws. 
Underlying these themes is the contingency of social construc-
tion: what we create depends upon the community at a partic-
ular time in history. These postmodern perspectives help to 
explain the United States Supreme Court's shifting construc-
tions what constitutes a "search" police practice under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
II. COURT'S CONSTRUCTIONS OF A 
FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEARCH" 
When the United States Supreme Court decides a Fourth 
Amendment issue, it frames its decision by using rationales 
embraced by the communities of lawyers, judges and some 
scholars. To date, the Court has not released an opinion stat-
ing, "We decide the case today this way because to do so is 
simply good policy." Granted it may add such a statement 
after offering other arguments to support its decision, 113 but 
the way in which it talks about the Fourth Amendment issue 
depends upon which rhetorical arguments it selects from the 
communities' package of acceptable arguments. From a 
postmodernist's perspective, the Court could have offered 
several different justifications to support its holding, and the 
Court could have decided many cases differently. In short, 
multiple paths for decisionmaking are possible, and the 
Court's jurisprudence in defining a Fourth Amendment 
112 Schanck, supra note 23, at 2572. 
113 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). In Camara, the 
Court examined and rejected many arguments for allowing warrantless adminis-
trative searches. It concluded by stating that "of course, in applying any reason-
ableness standard, includLng one of constitutional dimension, an argument that 
the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration." 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533. After considering what would constitute sound public 
policy, the Court concluded that it did "not fmd the public need argument disposi-
tive." ld. 
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"search" reveals these different approaches. 
In defining a Fourth Amendment "search," the Court has 
familiar rhetorical tools at hand: textual arguments, 114 his-
torical arguments, 115 structural arguments, 116 arguments 
arising from precedents and explicit policy arguments.117 Be-
cause the legal community has never stated that one type of 
114 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from 
Vagueness Doctrine? 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 401 (2001) ("Despite an explicit 
reference in the Constitution's text that limits governmental intrusions, the 
Court's Fourth Amendment cases regularly allow police broad discretion in con-
ducting searches and seizures. At the same time, the Court's vagueness cases 
have invalidated criminal statutes-even when they do not directly affect any 
enumerated right-when the statutes grant police too much discretion."). 
110 See, e.g., Morgan· Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1707, 1709 (1996) (noting that "[l]awyers writing briefs, judi-
cial opinions, and scholarly commentaries tend to treat history as but one more 
source of evidence to be deployed in support of their arguments"). After examin-
ing Fourth Amendment histories, Cloud warned "constitutional decision makers 
[to) be skeptical when lawyers claim to have discovered the Amendment's precise 
meaning in its complex history." Id. at 1746-47. For Cloud, the history of the 
Fourth Amendment can nevertheless offer "broad background principles favoring 
privacy, property, and liberty." Id. at 1747. He concluded, "illtimately, we do have 
to make up our own minds about what the law will be in this time and in this 
place." Id. see also David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Com-
mon Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 162 (2002) (highlighting the Court's inconsistent 
consideration of history: the '"new Fourth Amendment originalism' . . . was obvi-
ously in considerable tension with the modernizing ahistorical approach of Katz 
and Terry") (quoting David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (2000)). 
118 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founder's Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and 
the Power of Technological Surveillance after Kyllo, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1325, 1328 
(2002). By invoking a structural perspective, one linked to separation of powers 
concerns, Professor Ku has argued against the Court's "removing entire categories 
of searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny." I d. He has contended that "new 
surveillance technologies must be treated as searches subject to Fourth Amend-
ment restraints" in light of "the doctrine of separation of powers." ld. at 148. For 
Professor Ku, this view of the Fourth Amendment would "protect the public from 
arbitrary and unrestrained executive power." I d. 
117 See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close In On 
the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1103, 1141-60 (1992) (examin.ing 
policy arguments in support and in opposition to police officers' need to obtain 
warrants in a variety of circumstances). Professor Tomkovicz distinguished "policy" 
arguments from "symbolic arguments," which he characterized as an examination 
of "which symbols and messages are more compatible with the kind of society our 
ancestors envisioned." Id. at 1162. He recognized that "[o)ur choices will undoubt-
edly be influenced by the symbols we see and the messages we hear" and that 
"neither choice is incontrovertible." Id. at 1163. 
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argument always trumps another type of argument, the Court 
is able to wander down different paths simply by relying on a 
different category to decide a similar issue. In addition, within 
each category, the Court has a variety of arguments to support 
its decision. For example, the Court may selectively cite cases 
to support its position; it may distinguish other cases by creat-
ing a new gloss on prior cases that it now finds constitutional-
ly sufficient; it may overrule prior cases or it may trash some 
but not all of its prior cases by retaining the "essential hold-
ing" of a prior cases. The Court may also blend these con-
structed categories by weaving them together, as in looking to 
history to illuminate what it discerns the text to mean. With 
these diverse and contrasting rhetorical arguments, the Court 
gets to choose how to frame and resolve a decision. 118 
In deciding whether the challenged conduct was a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court's initial basis was property law; it then characterized 
privacy as an essential component of determining whether a 
"search" had occurred. In its move from property to privacy, 
the Court cited language in old cases to make its shift to ap-
pear less jarring. The Court's broadly written 1886 decision in 
Boyd v. United States, for example, has given the Court lan-
guage to select and focus on at different times. The Boyd 
Court discussed "the very essence of constitutional liberty and 
security," the need to protect the "sanctity of a man's home 
and privacies of life" and an "indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property."119 Later the 
Court repeatedly referred to the Fourth Amendment as pro-
tecting "personal security," generally not to define a 
"search,"120 but rather to describe an individual's interest 
118 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: 
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 583 
(1996) (noting that even judges operating from a "formalist" perspective may as-
cribe "alternative outcomes for the same event."). I d. at 583. For Cloud, different 
outcomes are possible because a "decisionmaker may conclude that the properties 
suppressed by a particular rule are relevant to the events in the instant case, 
and choose to apply an alternative rule that emphasizes those relevant character-
istics while suppressing others accentuated by the rejected rule." ld. 
119 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
120 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 n.8 (1948 ). In Johnson, 
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protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The categories of property and privacy (as well as person-
al security and liberty) from a postmodernist's view have per-
meable and overlapping boundaries, allowing us to understand 
the Court's shifting rhetorical groundings. In the end, even 
though we may view the Court's paths in defining a "search," 
we are not certain as to what a particular path means when 
the facts under consideration are different from decided cases; 
we do not know how long the Court will stay on that road, nor 
do we know what the next road looks like and what its appli-
cation will mean under the Fourth Amendment. What we do 
know is that the Court, like academic scholars, offers argu-
ments for constructing the meaning of the Constitution, which 
is all it can do. 
A. Constructing the Fourth Amendment with 
a "Property" Foundation 
The Court first extensively examined the Fourth Amend-
ment in Boyd v. United States. 121 At issue was a 
government's subpoena, issued pursuant to a statute, compel-
ling a company to produce an invoice to show the purchase of 
goods for which it had not paid duties.122 The statute provid-
ed that if the company did not produce the papers, the 
government's allegations were deemed true, allowing civil 
the Court cited a 1921 decision broadly describing the rights protected by the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution: 
The effect of [our) decisions cited is: that such rights are declared to be 
indispensable to the "full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty 
and private property"; that they are to be regarded as of the very essence 
of constitutional liberty; . . . these Amendments should receive a liberal 
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or "gradual 
depreciation" of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of 
courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officer. 
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 17 n.8 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 303, 304 
(1921)). But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (declaring that "a careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces a person's clothing all over his or her body in at 
attempt to fmd weapons" is a search and noting such a frisk is a "serious intru-
sion upon the sanctity of the person"). 
121 116 U.S. 616 (1886). For a brief discussion of the Court's prior references to 
the Fourth Amendment, see Cloud, supra note 118, at 573 n.77. 
122 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18. 
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forfeiture of the allegedly purchased goods. 123 In determining 
that this compulsory process of private papers was an "unrea-
sonable search and seizure, "124 the Court did not define what 
constituted a "search" or "seizure,"125 but it did describe a 
"right" protected by the Fourth Amendment: the "right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and privacy property, 
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction for 
some public offence. "126 Yet, in deciding the case, the Court 
focused on property law. 127 
The Boyd Court distinguished between property in which 
the government was entitled to possess and that which is it 
was not. Lawful possession lay in the "seizure of stolen 
goods, "128 "seizure of goods forfeited a breach of revenue 
laws"129 and "goods seized on attachment. "130 Unlawful pos-
session in this case arose from compelling a person to produce 
"private" papers. The Court stated that the "two things differ 
toto coelo. "131 The Court thus constructed classes and stated 
that the classes were different, a classic rhetorical tool. 
To justify its distinctions, the Court cited another classic 
123 Id. at 621-22. 
m Id. at 622. 
123 Id. (implying that "compulsory production of a man's private papers" was 
"equivalent" to a "search and seizure"). 
128 Id. at 630. 
127 Id. at 623-24. Professor Morgan Cloud has differently characterized the 
Fourth Amendment foundation that the Court created in Boyd by viewing the 
decision through the lens of its era-Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908). 
Cloud, supra note 118, at 580. Cloud strongly emphasized the Court's explicit 
references to "liberty" and acknowledged a role for implicit linking of property 
interests with an individuaPs interest in "liberty" or "personal autonomy." Cloud, 
supra note 118, at 580. He explained that "the Boyd decision is provocative pre-
cisely because it defmed this realm of personal autonomy largely in terms of 
property rights." Cloud, supra note 118, at 580. Earlier, however, he noted that 
such categories are not discrete: "Personal security, liberty, and private property 
are not discrete interests; they unite to define significant attributes of individual 
freedom in the democracy." Cloud, supra note 118, at 576. See generally AKmL 
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND Cru:MINAL PROCEDURE: FIRsT PRINCIPLES 23 
(1997) (criticizing Boyd for its embracing of "property worship"). 
128 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. 
129 [d. 
130 !d. at 624. 
131 Id. at 623. 
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rhetorical tool-framer's intent. 132 The Court stated that its 
property class distinctions derived from the "contemporary or 
then recent history," which had condemned the earlier English 
practices of using writs of assistance and general warrants. 
Writs of assistance arbitrarily gave officials great discretion to 
search for smuggled goods133 and general warrants, which 
similarly allowed officials to search for private papers. 134 The 
Court stated that these oppressive practices "were in the 
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, and were considered sufficiently explanatory of 
what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures. "135 
The Court proceeded to link the Fourth Amendment to 
trespass law. It quoted Lord Camden, who had authored Eng-
lish opinions celebrated by both the English and the colo-
nists. 136 In these opinions liberty meant having secure prop-
erty interests. 137 According to the Court, Lord Camden stat-
132 See, e.g., Lipkin, supra note 23, at 368 n.l59 (stating that "[i)f originalism 
contends that it is the correct methodology because the Framers intended it to 
be, the argument is circular;" adding that even if the Constitution contained a 
clause that the "Framer's intent should control," the clause would still be subject 
to different interpretations, one linked to nontextaul arguments, such as "the 
correct political theory"). With a different casting of history, Professor White, 
however, can envision history as an interpretative "restraint:" 
One might argue that with the loss of objectivity there is nothing to 
prevent present actors from creating their own versions of history, de-
signed to conform to or reinforce their contemporary agendas. But that 
argument is itself modernist-inspired. It proceeds from a conception of 
time as segmented, in which actors in the "present" have a discretely 
different experience and set of attitudes from actors in the past, and 
more fundamentally, in which actors in the present are capable of over-
whelming or wholly erasing their past .... [C)ontemporaries, [however,) 
cannot escape the set of attitudes and experiences that defmes their exis-
tence as occupants of a particular moment in time. 
See White, supra note 69, at 619-20. This type of "restraint," however, has not lead 
to a uniform construction of history, as well explained by Professor White, as he 
examined the different constructions of history by critical legal scholars and 
"originalists." White, supra note 69, at 580-96. 
133 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. 
•u ld. at 626. 
135 Id. at 626-27. 
136 ld. at 626. 
137 Id. at 627 (quoting Camden as stating that the "'great end for which men 
entered into society was to secure their property' and that even the 'bruising the 
grass' may be a trespass if a person offers no justification") (citation omitted). 
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ed, "[p]apers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his 
dearest property."138 Although Camden declared that the 
"eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a tres-
pass,"139 the compulsory production of papers is like the 
"[b]reaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers."140 
The Boyd Court thus viewed the Fourth Amendment as pro-
tecting "sacred right"141 of property, which also encompassed 
"personal security and personalliberty."142 
After Boyd, the Court continued to interpret the Fourth 
Amendment through the lens of property law.143 Yet, when 
trespass law did not address the government's access to intan-
gible information, such as telephone conversations, the Court 
in Olmstead v. United States144 had to decide whether wire 
tapping constituted a "search" or "seizure" protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. In 1928, with the Court's property per-
spective of the Fourth Amendment, it held that tapping tele-
phone conversations did not constitute a "search" or "sei-
zure."145 
To justify its interpretation, the Court viewed the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment to indicate no protection 
because it listed "material things-the person, the house, his 
papers, or his effects."146 The Warrant Clause, the Court 
added, similarly referred to tangibles capable of being seized. 
In addition, officials installed the wire taps without trespass-
ing on the criminal defendants' property, 147 and they ac-
quired evidence "by the use of the sense of hearing and that 
138 I d. at 627-28. 
139 Id. at 628. 
140 ld. at 630. 
U1 Id. 
U2 Id. 
143 Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, 
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 314-20 (1998); Cloud, supra 
note 118, at 581. 
144 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
146 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
146 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. 
147 ld. at 457. 
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only."148 For the Court, it could not "enlarge[]" the language 
of the Fourth Amendment to "forbid hearing or sight. "149 
To further support its holding, the Court stated that 
officials' of violations of trespass laws may not be sufficient to 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.150 It cited a prior decision 
in which it had held that viewing activities in an open field, 
even if accomplished by a trespass, did not constitute a 
"search of person, house, papers, or effects. "151 
For its interpretive grounding, the Olmstead Court also 
quoted a passage from the 1925 decision of Carroll v. United 
States, 152 the same passage that the modern Court had re-
peatedly quoted, 153 paraphrased154 or distorted. 155 "The 
"" ld. at 464. 
"" ld. at 465. 
1150 ld. 
151 Id (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
152 267 u.s. 132 (1925). 
153 See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (authored by Justice 
Thomas). 
164 See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (authored by Justice 
Thomas) (stating that "'[a)lthough the underlying command of the Fourth Amend-
ment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable,' New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985), our effort to give content to this term may be guided 
by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment"). 
155 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (authored 
by Justice Souter) (stating that "[i]n reading the Amendment, we are guided by 
'the traditional protections, against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded 
by the common law at the time of framing,' Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 
931 (1995) . . . since '[a]n examination of the common-law understanding of an 
officer's authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely 
dispositive consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have 
thought to be unreasonable,' Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980)"). In 
Atwater, Justice O'Connor dissented, allowing Justice Souter the opportunity to 
criticize her for not invoking her prior practice of using the common law to assess 
reasonableness. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345 n._14. Justice O'Connor previously dis-
sented from the Court's rejection of the common-law rule that allowed officers to 
shoot fleeing felons. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (authored by 
Justice Scalia) (stating that "we inquire first whether the action was regarded as 
an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was 
framed. . . . Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search 
or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness .... "); Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (authored by Justice Scalia) (stat-
ing that "where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the 
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Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was 
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was 
adopted[,] and in a manner which will conserve public inter-
ests, as well as the interests and rights of individual citi-
zens."156 Although the Court did not elaborate on the signifi-
cance of common law, it did state that the language of the 
Fourth Amendment acted as a restraint. 
It then offered a perspective that it would later discard 
under a different Fourth Amendment paradigm: "The 
reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a tele-
phone instrument . . . intends to project his voice to those" 
outside his house. 157 In contrast, Justice Brandeis in his dis-
sent rejected this construction, inviting the Court to interpret 
the Fourth Amendment with an appreciation of the 
government's growing investigative capacities.158 He invoked 
the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, exclaiming "[w]e 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing,"15g,a malleable statement that ironically permits both 
broad and narrow interpretations of the Constitution.160 In 
type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional proVISion was enacted, 
whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard 'is judged by bal-
ancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests"' (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989), which quoted Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 654 (1979)). But see Wyoming v. Hougton, 526 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that "[t)o my knowledge, we have never restricted ourselves to 
a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental 
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law 'yields no 
answer"'). 
158 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
149 (1925)). 
167 ld. at 466. 
158 ld. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 472 (quoting M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)). 
160 Supreme Court Justices have often quoted this famous phrase from 
M'Culloch, sometimes to limit the government's power and liability and sometimes 
to expand the government's power and liability. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706,807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting constitutional sovereign im-
munity for states in state courts and declaring that since M'Culloch the "Court 
has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various clauses 
of [the Constitution), over objects of which the Fathers could not have dreamed"); 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (stating that "only the 
most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional 
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his dissent, Justice Brandeis looked to Marshall's words to 
underscore the need to apply the Fourth Amendment to con-
texts not imaginable in 1791: "Clauses guaranteeing to the 
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must 
have a similar capacity to adaptation to a changing 
world."161 
This property-based perspective of the Fourth Amendment 
thus raised property-framed issues: whether the government 
had searched and seized a tangible item, whether an "area" 
had constitutional protection, 162 and if so, whether the gov-
ernmental officials trespassed by "physical invasion." As time 
passed, the Court's property-framed issues were sometimes 
dispositive163 and sometimes merely relevant. 164 The 
sense'") (citation omitted); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, (1986) (Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion holding that negligent governmental conduct does not impli-
cate the Fourteenth Amendment and stating that "[o)ur Constitution deals with 
the larger concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to 
supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability 
for injuries that attend living together in society"); Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 188 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating "[T)he Court's contention 
that, because a field is not a house or effect, it is not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment is inconsistent with [precedent) . . . and with the understanding of 
the nature of constitutional adjudication from which it derives"); Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 731, 758-59 (1982) (Burger, J., concurring) (deriving absolute immu-
nity for presidential actions from the "constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers" and stating that "[c)onstitutional adjudication often bears unpalatable 
fruit"); Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (inviting the Court to consider the "real world" of racial discrimi-
nation and explaining that "[i)n order to treat some people equally, we must treat 
them differently"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 732 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing for a broader definition of liberty or property under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to safeguard a person's interest in reputation). 
181 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472. 
162 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (stating that 
warrantless use of a spike microphone was unconstitutional, not because of tres-
pass law, but rather because of "the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area"). 
163 See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) (stating that prison 
cell is not a constitutionally protected area because it "shares none of the attrib-
utes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room"); On Lee v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (stating that "no trespass had been com-
mitted" by officers using concealed microphone while in defendant's laundry). 
184 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963) (refusing 
to distinguish between "verbal evidence" and the "more common tangible fruits of 
[an) unwarranted intrusion"); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (stating that the "deci-
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Court's shifting emphasis of issues allowed the property-based 
foundation to slowly crack. 
This movement is discernible by comparing the Court's 
1942 decision in Goldman v. United States165 with its 1961 
decision in Silverman v. United States. 166 In Goldman, the 
Court relied on Olmstead to exclude oral statements from 
protection when officials, without a warrant, gathered infor-
mation by using a listening device attached to a wall, but in 
Silverman granted protection to oral statements when offi-
cials, also without a warrant, used a microphone to puncture a 
baseboard and listen. 167 In both cases, the Court refused to 
overrule Omstead, 168 but in Silverman, the Court's language 
reflected the tension in its constructed property foundation; it 
declared, "Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevita-
bly measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real 
property law."169 The Court, however, did not completely 
discard history, but selected that part related to the home. It 
noted the "long history"170 of protecting a person's interest in 
the home, language that is also reflective of more modern deci-
sions: 
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his 
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the 
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the 
Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth 
protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized soci-
sion here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as 
a matter of local law"; determining technical intrusion of a "constitutionally pro-
tected area"). 
160 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment not implicated by governmental officials' use of a device at-
tached to a wall to listen to a conversation). 
166 See, e.g., Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (holding that officials' warrantless use 
of a microphone with a foot-long spike to puncture a baseboard, allowing the 
heating duct to act as "a conductor of sound," violated the Fourth Amendment). 
167 ld. 
188 ld. at 508 (determining no need to re-examine Olmstead in "light of recent 
and projected developments in the science of electronics"); Goldman, 316 U.S. at 
136 (stating that reconsideration of Olmstead "would serve no good purpose"). 
169 Id. at 511. 
uo Id. 
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ety must provide some oasis, some shelter from public scruti-
ny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate 
place which is a man's castle.171 
Recognizing its incremental changes, the Silverman Court 
stated, "We find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but 
we decline to go beyond it, even by a fraction of an inch. "172 
Later the Court would look at these cases and others, 173 
stating that they had "eroded"174 a property foundation for the 
Fourth Amendment. 175 In a series of three decisions issued in 
1967-Warden v. Hayden/16 Berger v. New York/77and Katz 
v. United States, 118-the Court looked back and viewed the 
foundation with a different perspective: the Fourth Amendment 
also protects an individual's interest in privacy.179 In charac-
171 ld. at 511 n.4 (quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affd, On Lee v. United States, 342 U.S. 941 
(1952). 
172 ld. at 512. 
173 See, e.g., Warden, 387 U.S. at 305 (stating that "[i)n determining whether 
someone is a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' we have re-
fused 'to import into the law . . . subtle distinctions, developed and refmed by 
the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than 
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is 
largely historical'") (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960)); id. 
at 305-06 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) for its suppression of 
stolen goods which at common law could have been seized); id. at 305 (declaring 
that "[t)he development of search and seizure law . . . is replete with examples of 
the transformation in substantive law brought about through the interaction of 
the felt need to protect privacy from unreasonable invasions and the flexibility in 
rulemaking made possible by the remedy of exclusion") (emphasis added). 
174 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (stating that later cases have "negated" statements 
in Olmstead "that a conversation passing over a telephone wire cannot be said to 
come within the Fourth Amendment's enumeration of 'persons, houses, papers, 
and effectsm). 
175 See, e.g., Warden, 387 U.S. at 304 (stating that the "premise that property 
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been dis-
credited"). 
176 387 u.s. 294 (1967). 
177 388 u.s. 41 (1967). 
178 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
179 In cases decided before 1967, the Court also referred to the Fourth 
Amendment's protection of privacy. For example, in 1949, the Court, in Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), described the "security of one's privacy against 
arbitrary intrusions by the police" to be "implicit in the concept of ordered tiber-
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terizing its decisions as a "shift in emphasis from property to 
privacy,"180 the Court did not completely abandon historical 
perspectives of property. 181 Instead, it sought to bring privacy 
interests into the forefront, a move that both afforded govern-
mental officials greater investigative means and gave individu-
als "the remedy of suppression."182 
B. Reconfiguring the Fourth Amendment's Foundation: 
Protecting Society's Interest in Privacy 
Although the Court decided numerous Fourth Amendment 
cases in 1967/83 several decisions highlighted privacy as an 
ty." Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28 (emphasis added) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 325, (1937)). Similarly in 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961), referred to "the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy." Mapp, 367 
U.S. at 655. It also quoted Boyc£s reference to the Fourth Amendment protecting 
"the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." ld. at 646 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
180 Warden, 387 U.S. at 304. 
181 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 & 41 (1988) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit "the warrantless search and seizure 
of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home," which was an "area 
accessible to the public"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987) 
(relying on the 1924 case of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) to aid 
it in creating four factors to defme what kind of an area represents "curtilage," a 
common law construction to grant the area around the home the "same protection 
under the law of burglary": "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 
the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the 
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and the steps taken by 
the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by"); Dow 
Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236, 237-38 (1986) (stating that area 
surrounding a large industrial complex "can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere 
between 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking the critical characteristics of both," 
but recasting these property questions under the umbrella of society's "privacy" 
expectations). 
182 Warden, 387 U.S. at 307 (stating that suppression, "which made possible 
protection of privacy from unreasonable searches without regard to proof of a 
superior property interest, likewise provides the procedural device necessary for 
allowing otherwise peimissible searches and seizures conducted solely to obtain 
evidence of a crime"). 
183 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (establishing Fourth 
Amendment standard for administrative health and safety inspections of the 
home). In Camara, the Court recognized privacy associated with one's home: 
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave 
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell 
488 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 72 
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment: Warden v. 
Hayden/84 Berger v. New York/85 and, most intensely, Katz 
v. United States. 186ln these three cases, the Court lifted pri-
vacy strands from prior cases and highlighted them, thus al-
lowing the Fourth Amendment to apply to some police practices 
that previously would not have been a "search." The Court 
recharacterized some older cases, which focused on property 
concepts, to symbolize the Fourth Amendment's protection for 
an individual's interest in privacy, 187 and it overruled some 
prior cases, 188 characterizing them as lacking a privacy focus. 
Yet, the Court's construction and application of its privacy 
standard has also resulted in many police practices not being 
"searches." 
In Warden v. Hayden, 189 the Court explicitly rejected a 
property focus for the Fourth Amendment as it strengthened 
the power of the government to gather information leading to 
in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of 
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be 
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government or enforce-
ment agent. 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 529 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 14 (1948)); see also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (concluding 
"that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial pre-
mises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution 
or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure"). 
1
.. 387 u.s. 294 (1967). 
185 388 u.s. 41 (1967). 
186 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
187 See generally Clancy, supra note 143, at 329 (stating that "after adopting 
privacy as the measure of the individual's interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court had to retrofit its prior case law to coincide with it."). 
186 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that 
"the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subse-
quent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine can no longer be regarded as control-
ling"); Warden, 387 U.S. at 300, 309-10 (rejecting prior case law distinction be-
tween the government's seizing "mere evidence" and the government's seizing 
"instrumentalities, fruits or contraband"), overruling Gouled v. United States, 255 
U.S. 298 (1921); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that "I join the opinion of the Court because at long last is 
overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. United States, . . . and its offspring and brings 
wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping fully within the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment."). 
189 387 u.s. 294 (1967). 
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conviction. It stated, "The premise that property interests con-
trol the right of the government to search and seize has been 
discredited. "190 To give police officers a bigger investigative 
power, the Court discarded prior decisions/91 which had limit-
ed authority to search and seize contraband, fruits, and instru-
mentalities of crime. Older cases considered what kind of prop-
erty officials could search and seize. With the prior case law 
having this property focus, the Court and the dissene92 recast 
the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, not property. It 
explained, "Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to 
a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an 
instrumentality, fruit or contraband."193 The Court then pro-
ceeded to find the old property distinctions to be "wholly irra-
tional" when considered from an individual's interest in priva-
cy.194 
With a privacy perspective highlighted in Warden, the 
Court continued discussing privacy in Berger, but ironically 
concluded with the property language of its prior cases, stating 
that a state statute unconstitutionally "permit[ted] a trespasso-
ry invasion of the home [and] office."195 Berger declared un-
constitutional a state statute that failed to limit electronic 
1110 Warden, 387 U.S. at 304. 
191 Id. at 306 (stating the "premise in Gouled [v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 
(1921)] that government may not seize evidence simply for the purpose of proving 
crime has likewise been discredited"). The Court also stated that even though 
Congress abided by Gouled's property distinctions, it found such adherence "attrib-
utable more to chance than considered judgment." I d. at 308. 
192 Id. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas had authored two years 
earlier Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which he articulated a 
right to privacy arising from the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 484. In considering the emanations from the Fourth Amendment, he cited 
Boyd's reference to the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." I d. 
(citation omitted). He also discerned the emanation by considering the Court's 
earlier reference to the "Fourth Amendment as creating a 'right to privacy."' I d. 
at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)). When considering the 
mere evidence rule in Warden, Justice Douglas similarly reaffirmed his perspec-
tive that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy. Warden, 387 U.S. at 312-15. 
He referred to Lord Camden's decision of 1765 as establishing a "zone of privacy 
which no governmental official may enter." Id. at 314-15 (citation omitted). 
193 Warden, 387 U.S. at 302. 
UM Id. 
190 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967). 
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eavesdropping.196 The Court explicitly held that the electronic 
capturing of a conversation was a "search" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.197 It viewed prior precedent as 
having "negated" its holding in Olmstead that a wiretap of a 
telephone line from a home was not a "search. "198 Even 
though it briefly concluded using its old property-based per-
spective, mentioning "trespassory invasion,"199 it repeatedly 
characterized the Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy.200 
The Court declared, "It is now well settled that 'the Fourth 
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable 
against the States. "201 It also described the "'core of the 
Fourth Amendment'" as protecting the '"security of one's priva-
cy .'"202 In addition, it also referred to an interest mentioned in 
older decisions, but one not moved to the forefront: an 
individual's interest in "security. "203 
198 Berger, 388 U.S. at 44. 
197 Id. at 51. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 64. 
200 Id. at 49. The Court quoted the famous passage from Boyd, which quoted 
Lord Camden to construct a view of framers' intent: 
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of consti-
tutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of 
the case . . . they apply to all invasions on the part of the government 
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privac~s of 
life. 
ld. at 49 (emphasis added) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) 
(quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)); see also id. at 63 
(stating that "[t)his is no formality that we require today but a fundamental rule 
that has long been recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in America") 
(emphasis added); id. at 62 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 
(1963), "the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitutes 
a great danger to the privacy of the individual") (emphasis added); id. at 56 (citing 
prior precedent for recognizing that a recording constituted "an invasion of privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added). 
201 Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
202 Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)). Older decisions also 
mentioned privacy, but not as the means of defining a Fourth Amendment search. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (stating that "[w)hen 
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to 
be decided by a judicial officer, not by policeman or government enforcement 
agent."). 
200 Berger, 388 U.S. at 53 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 
(1967)). In Camara, the Court stated that the "basic purpose of this Amendment, 
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In its seminal decision in Katz v. United States/04 the 
Court-in five opinions205-explicitly acknowledged a shift in 
paradigms for interpreting what constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "search." At issue was governmental officials' attachment 
of an "electronic listening and recording device to the outside of 
a public telephone booth."206 In writing for the Court, Justice 
Stewart discarded the "'trespass' doctrine" from Olmstead and 
Goldman207 and stated that the "Fourth Amendment protects 
people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches 
and seizures."208 The Court held that the officials had con-
ducted a Fourth Amendment "search. "209 In doing so, the 
Court looked to modern practices in examining the technology 
at issue-telephones. The Court stated, "To read the Constitu-
tion more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public 
telephone has come to play in private communication. "210 
The Court found unhelpful how the parties had framed the 
"search" issues: "[w]hether a public telephone booth is a consti-
tutionally protected area" and whether "physical penetration of 
a constitutionally protected area" is necessary for the Court to 
hold that a "search" occurred.211 A "search" had occurred be-
cause Katz, in using the telephone, had shut the door behind 
as recognized by countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. 
2 
.. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
205 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967). Justice Stewart authored 
the opinion for the Court, which all Justices joined except dissenting Justice 
Black. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. (Justice Marshall did not participate in the deci-
sion). Three justices wrote concurring opinions (Douglas, joined by Justice 
Brennan, White and Harlan); these opinions in part disagreed as to whether the 
Fourth Amendment had a "national security" exception to the warrant require-
ment, an issue not before the Court but mentioned and left unresolved by Justice 
Stewart. ld. at 358-64. Justice Harlan's concurrence articulated a standard for 
defining a Fourth Amendment "search" later adopted by a majority of the Court. 
ld. at 361; see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (applying 
Harlan's two-part inquiry for a Fourth Amendment "search"). 
206 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
201 ld. at 353. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 352. 
211 !d. at 349, 353. 
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him, excluding the "uninvited ear."212 The Court articulated a 
theory that questioned whether the person had "exposed" the 
information: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even it his own home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. "213 
When defining a "search" from this reference, Justice Stew-
art distinguished between two types of privacy: "a general right 
of privacy" and a privacy interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court stated that "the protection of a person's 
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other peo-
ple-is like the protection of his property and of his very life, 
largely left to the law of the individual States."214 The Fourth 
Amendment, in contrast protected "privacy," as well as other 
interests.215 As an example, Justice Stewart offered that a 
person has a Fourth Amendment interest in property, whether 
officials seize it publicly or privately.216 
In elaborating on this new "search" doctrine, Justice 
Harlan in a concurrence articulated the modern Court's 
"search" inquiry: whether the person had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy and whether this expectation is "one that society 
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'~17 He did not, howev-
er, discard examining the "place" under consideration. He ex-
plained that a person's "home is, for most purposes, a place 
where he expects privacy."218 In addition, he recast the physi-
cal penetration inquiry to include "electronic invasion,"219 
stating that requiring "physical penetration" is "bad physics as 
well as bad law. "220 
In contrast, Justice Black's dissent reflected prior case law 
and a different role for the Court. 221 Not only did he not want 
212 ld. at 352. 
213 ld. at 351. 
2
" ld. at 350. 
215 ld. 
218 ld. at 350 n.4. 
217 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
21s Id. 
219 ld. at 360. 
220 Id. 
221 ld. at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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to discard precedent, 222 but he could not create a construction 
of the word "search" to include electronic eavesdropping.223 He 
sarcastically accused the Court of preferring "philosophical 
discourses" to the mundane task of reading the words of the 
Fourth Amendment.224 In addition, he constructed a framer's 
intent argument to exclude this modern practice, noting that 
the framers had not prohibited general eavesdropping. 225 He 
rejected the need to "rewrite the Amendment in order 'to bring 
it into harmony with the times.'"226 
In examining telephone technology, the majority and the 
dissent in Katz faced the same interpretive task: how to apply 
the Fourth Amendment to a practice not explicitly addressed by 
the text, one that did not exist at the time of the framing, and 
one inconsistently addressed by precedent. In time, the Court 
adopted Justice Harlan's two-part standard for a "search," yet 
one could only know the meaning of the standard through the 
Court's application of it. The progeny of Katz fails to provide a 
coherent framework for predicting when an activity is a 
"search," just as a postmodernist would expect. The progeny 
does reveal, however, the Court's rhetorical flourishes upon the 
privacy theme established in Katz. 
Ill. COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
Since Katz v. United States, the Court has decided numer-
ous cases revealing its varied conceptions of privacy. The 
Court's decisions sometimes have clear boundaries, but mostly 
what privacy means is still uncertain for a variety of reasons. 
Advances in technology often invite the Court to draw analo-
gies from one investigative practice to another one. An analogy 
by definition is an inexact comparison, allowing the analyst to 
= Id. at 367-72. 
223 Id. at 364-65. 
224 Id. at 365. 
225 Id. at 366. He explained that the framers were "no doubt aware" of the 
practice of eavesdropping, "and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use 
of evidence obtained by eavesdropping . . . they would have used the appropriate 
language to do so in the Fourth Amendment." I d. 
228 Id. at 364. 
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see both similarities and dissimilarities. Depending upon 
whether the analyst emphasizes a dissimilarity or a similarity, 
the application is often uncertain. Privacy is also a shifting 
ground in society, one that eludes sharp characterization. As 
Professors Wayne LaFave and Tony Amsterdam have noted, 
deciding what constitutes a "search" is simply a "value judg-
ment," one considering whether a particular police practice is 
"inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. "227 By 
highlighting those cases in which the Court considered new 
technology, we can discern the Court's rhetorical devices for 
labeling activities as implicating privacy protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. In doing so, we are able to view the 
Court's recent decision in Kyllo v. United States as meandering 
down another new road, but one not labeled by the Court. 
Even though the Court has thematically described its 
"search" jurisprudence as protecting an individual's interest in 
privacy, the privacy theme masks the Court's numerous rhetor-
ical devices for deciding cases, devices that give the Court great 
flexibility in deciding whether a "search" occurred. In examin-
ing new technology, the Court constructed the relationship 
between privacy and technology using several rhetorical devic-
es: (1) declaring a police investigative practice to be sui generis, 
in a class by itself, because it was so nominally intrusive; (2) 
characterizing public and private disclosure as clearly discem-
ible acts (i.e, not viewing privacy as being on a continuum or 
representing a normative judgment); (3) distinguishing between 
different types of sensory enhancement devices, with visual 
surveillance and olfactory enhancement, affording officials 
greatest freedom from restraints by the Fourth Amendment, 
but with non-enhanced, basic physical touch often implicating 
the Fourth Amendment. 
227 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 
§ 2.l(d), at 393 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 (1974)). 
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A. Sui Generis Investigative Activity: Not a "Search" 
In United States v. Place,228 the Court held that no 
"search" occurred because officers used nominally intrusive 
technology-a canine sniff for drugs-to gather incriminating 
information.229 Instead of holding that the dog sniff was "rea-
sonable" under the Fourth Amendment, 230 the Court declared 
the practice to be unique, in a class of its own, one not even 
implicating the Fourth Amendment. 231 In doing so, the Court 
created a special category for an investigative practice. The 
Court first envisioned only one type of investigative practice 
deserving of the label sui generis-a canine sniff of luggage for 
drugs. 232 In time, analogy allowed the Court in United States 
v. Jacobsen233 to extend the "no search" label to another nomi-
nally intrusive practice-field testing of a white powder to deter-
mine if it were cocaine.234 With two types of technological ac-
tivities falling within the class, the Jacobsen Court did not 
label field testing to be sui generis; reasoning by analogy was 
sufficient for the Court. (Despite the Court's categorization, 
another rhetorical device would still allow the Court a way out 
from its "no search" conclusion-factual distinctions from case to 
case.) 
In two cases, Place and the recent decision of City of India-
napolis v. Edmond,235 the Court determined that dog sniffs 
were not "searches" under the facts of the cases.236 Although 
228 462 u.s. 696, 707 (1983). 
228 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
230 Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun la-
beled the Court's "no search" determination to be dicta, but hypothesized that "a 
dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justi-
fied ... [by) reasonable suspicion." Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
231 Id. at 707. 
212 Id. The Court stated, "We are aware of no other investigatory procedure 
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in 
the content revealed by the procedure." I d. 
m 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
214 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984). 
2
.. 531 u.s. 32 (2001). 
238 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); Place, 462 U.S. at 
707. 
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the Court's determinations in both cases were dicta, the deci-
sions cited two aspects relevant for its conclusion: the nominal 
intrusion by the dog's sniffing and the limited disclosure of 
information. 237 
In Place, a dog sniffed an airline passenger's luggage; offi-
cers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the passenger was 
carrying illegal narcotics, which according to the Court, allowed 
the officers to briefly detain the passenger. Before concluding 
that the sniff of luggage was not a search, the Court made the 
following comment: "Obviously, if this investigative procedure 
is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of 
[the passenger's] luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to the 
sniff test-no matter how brief-could not be justified on less 
than probable cause."238 One may infer from this statement 
that the Court may have seemed constrained by its prior 
search jurisprudence and that one way out was to declare a 
sniff not to be a search. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring 
opinion in the judgment, drew that inference, stating that the 
Court could have labeled the sniff to be a search, but one justi-
fied by reasonable suspicion, not necessarily requiring probable 
cause. 239 Instead, the Court created a special category for dog 
sniffs because "this investigative technique is much less intru-
sive than a typical search>724° and because the sniff produced a 
"limited disclosure. "241 In concluding, the Court also wove in 
the facts of the case; the sniff was a luggage "located in a pub-
lic place. >7242 
When the context shifted to sniffing the "exterior" of cars, 
the Court in City of Indianapolis cited Place to support its 
~·7 Edrrwnd, 531 U.S. at 53; Place, 462 U.S. at 707. In Place, the Court deter-
mined that officers unreasonably seized an airline passenger's luggage for ninety 
minutes while waiting to have a dog sniff it. Place, 462 U.S. at 710. In City of 
Indianapolis, the Court held that if the primary purpose of a roadblock was to 
search for drugs it was unconstitutional, but that walking a dog around an ille-
gally stopped car did "not transform the seizure [of the car and person) into a 
search." Edrrwnd, 531 U.S. at 40. 
~.. Place, 462 U.S. at 706. 
~•• Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
:uo Id. at 707. 
ut Id. 
wId. 
2002] "SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 497 
conclusion that no "search" occurred.243 Even though the 
Court held that roadblocks primarily designed to detect illegal 
drugs violated the Fourth Amendment,244 the Court in a sin-
gle paragraph disposed of the dog-sniffing issue.245 In con-
trast, the dissent in City of Indianapolis viewed the majority as 
relying on the officials' use of drug-detecting dogs to give the 
roadblocks an unconstitutional primary purpose. 246 For the 
majority, the dogs were irrelevant because the sniffs were not 
searches. 
The Court also extended the dog-sniff analysis to the chem-
ical testing for drugs in United States v. Jacobsen. 247 Officers 
examined white powder in clear bags that Federal Express 
employees discovered while opening a damaged package. The 
officers used three test tubes to determine if the powder was 
cocaine. The Court explained that "[w]hen a substance contain-
ing cocaine is placed in one test tube after another, it will 
cause liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors."248 Again 
the Court cited the dual rationale of Place-a nominally inva-
sive procedure with limited disclosure.249 For the Court, the 
testing did not compromise "any legitimate interest in privacy" 
because it only told the officers one fact-whether the substance 
was cocaine.250 In justifying its conclusion, the Court noted 
that the test would not disclose whether the white powder was 
"sugar or talcum powder."251 In contrast, the dissent dis-
agreed with the Court's "unbounded analysis," fearing that the 
Court was "redefm[ing] the term 'search' to exclude a broad 
... City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 40. 
,... Id. at 42. 
240 ld. at 40. 
248 Id. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting because the roadblocks 
"serve the State's accepted and significant interests of preventing drunken driving 
and checking for driver's licenses and vehicle registrations, and because there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the addition of the dog sniff lengthens 
these otherwise legitimate seizures"). 
247 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1984). 
248 Id. at 111 n.l. 
••• Id. at 122-24. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 122. 
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class of surveillance techniques. "252 In the end, the dissent 
did, however, agree that the testing did not implicate privacy 
because the owner had not hidden the powder in a "transpar-
ent pharmaceutical vial" to make it look like "legitimate medi-
cine."253 The dissent thus sought to focus on context to deter-
mine a search rather than the unique but limited testing proce-
dure. 
With the creation of a special category for dog sniffs, the 
Jacobsen Court thus expanded this category to include field 
testing for the presence of cocaine. In a related contest, the 
Court, again in dicta, suggested that another nominally intru-
sive and limited disclosure test might be valid pursuant to a 
lawful investigative stop-fingerprinting suspects in the 
field.254 In Hayes v. Florida,255 the Court explicitly left open 
whether officers who have reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity may fingerprint suspects during a brief detention. Al-
though the Court did not discuss the issue under its search 
doctrines,256 one may construct a parallel between Jacobsen's 
field drug-testing and field fingerprinting. 
This categorical exclusion is just one rhetorical device for 
quickly ending Fourth Amendment analysis. Another rhetorical 
device has involved the Court's dichotomy between what is 
"private" and what is "public." Instead of describing privacy as 
falling on a broad continuum, the Court has created another 
category in which technological activities are surprisingly (de-
pending on one's perspective) not "searches." 
B. Using Technology to Get Information from Trusted 
Third Parties: Not a "Search" 
The Katz Court also stated that no "search" occurs when 
individuals "expose" information to the public.257 In applying 
this strand of Katz, the Court constructed a rigid dichotomy 
252 Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
253 ld. at 142. 
254 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). 
256 Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816. 
256 Id. 
257 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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between private and public information, instead of viewing 
personal information as possessing different degrees of privacy. 
Under the Court's dichotomous construction, a person who 
reveals information to a trusted third-party has exposed that 
information to the "public."258 If the third-party then violates 
the confidence and gives officials the information, no "search" 
occurred because the individual "exposed" the information to 
the "public" by informing the trusted third person. The signifi-
cance to this private and public dichotomy emerges when offi-
cials used technology to gather such "exposed" information to 
third parties. A case representing this construction of privacy is 
Smith v. Maryland/59 a case ironically relied on by the mod-
ern Court in Kyllo v. United States, 260a case reaching a differ-
ent conclusion by using different rhetorical constructions. 
In Smith, officials used a "pen register" to record the local 
numbers that Smith had dialed from his home.261 Officials 
had asked a telephone company to install the device in its 
facility, not in Smith's home.262 The device worked by record-
ing the "electrical impulses" Smith made by dialing. 263 The 
Court applied Harlan's two-part inquiry in Katz and also relied 
on "search" cases decided before Katz. 264 The Court held that 
no "search" occurred265 when officials used this device to learn 
258 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 u.s. 435, 443 (1976). 
... 442 u.s. 735 (1979). 
260 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (citing case to explain its conclusion that a "search" oc-
curred); Kyllo, 533 u:s. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing case to explain his 
conclusion that no "search" occurred). For a discussion of Kyllo, see infra text in 
Part IV. 
261 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737-38. 
282 ld. at 737. 
263 Id. at 736 n.l. 
2~~< Id. at 739-40. The Court looked to cases in which the individual had told 
personal information to a "friend," who turned out to be an undercover official or 
an informant. ld. at 743-44 (citations omitted). The "friend," using technology, 
then transmitted the statements to others or recorded them. In these cases, the 
Court held before Katz that no "search" had occurred. See, e.g., Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (secretly using electronic equipment to record conver-
sation); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (using radio equipment to 
transmit conversations). 
266 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46. 
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which local numbers Smith had dialed. 
In applying the two-part inquiry, the Smith Court made 
several observations about the Katz standard. The Court ex-
plained that the first question-a person's subjective expectation 
of privacy-may at times need to be replaced by a "normative 
inquiry."266 Such circumstances, "where subjective expecta-
tions could play no meaningful role," according to the Court, 
would exist if the government had announced on television that 
no privacy existed or where a person had been conditioned by a 
"totalitarian country;" the normative question of "this nations 
traditions" would instead be considered.267 The circumstances 
of this case, for the Court, did not raise this normative ques-
tion. The Court also narrowly interpreted the second ques-
tion-whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
by characterizing the homeowner as voluntarily disclosing his 
telephone numbers to the public, even though the disclosure 
was to the telephone company for a "limited purpose."268 
Third, the Court also considered whether telephone companies 
had "routinely used" this technology.269 In doing so, the Court 
characterized the issue of routine use in two contrasting 
ways-it considered both actual practices270 and potential prac-
tices by telephone companies. 271 Fourth, the Court character-
ized the disclosure as limited, noting that the pen register 
would not even indicate whether a conversation had actually 
occurred.272 And most important, the Court framed the priva-
cy issue as an interest in the numbers dialed, not in the activi-
ty conducted in privacy of one's home.273 
As characterized by the Smith Court, the homeowner had 
neither a subjective, nor a reasonable, expectation of privacy 
"that the numbers ... dial[ed] will [be kept] secret."274 To 
266 Id. at 740 n.5. 
261 Id. 
266 Id. at 744 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
269 Id. at 742. 
270 Id. at 742-43. 
271 Id. at 745. 
272 Id. at 741-42. 
••• Id. at 742. 
••• Id. at 743. 
2002] "SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 501 
rebut his asserted subjective expectation of privacy, the Court 
cited both a Baltimore and District of Columbia telephone di-
rectory which informed subscribers that the phone company 
can help in "identifying to the authorities the origin of unwel-
come calls. "275 This notice, for the Court, undermined a sub-
jective expectation of privacy. Ironically, in addressing this 
issue, the Court stated that subscribers "must convey numerical 
information to the phone company."276 But later, in examining 
the second issue of reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court 
characterized the submission of numerical information as "vol-
untary;" Smith "voluntarily conveyed to [the telephone compa-
ny] information that it had facilities for recording and that it 
was free to record."277 One may try to reconcile the conflict by 
stating that the Court only in dicta addressed the second issue 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy, having determined that 
Smith lacked a subjective expectation of privacy. Yet, this in-
consistency highlights how the Court's constructions of "facts" 
influence the outcome. 
The Court also considered how telephone companies "rou-
tinely use0"278 pen registers under both Katz inquiries. Under 
the subjective prong of Katz, routine use meant actual practices 
of many telephone companies. The Court discerned routine use 
of pen registers in "checking billing operations, detecting fraud, 
and preventing violations of the law."279 Although the Court 
did not identify which violations that companies routinely de-
tected, it did declare that "most people . . . presumably have 
some awareness of one common use: to aid in the identification 
of persons making annoying or obscene calls."280 But when 
considering the second issue, the Court looked to potential 
practices-whether the telephone company could have used a 
pen register to record local calls.281 The Court refused to con-
275 Id. at 742-43 (citations omitted). 
276 Id. at 743. 
277 Id. at 745. 
278 Id. at 742, 745. 
278 Id. at 742 (citing United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 
(1977)). 
280 ld. 
281 ld. at 745. 
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sidered whether the specific telephone company involved had a 
practice of recording local calls. The Court attempted to justify 
its reliance on potential practice by stating that to do otherwise 
would be "to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment ... 
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation."282 In 
short, nationwide practices-actual and potential~ontributed 
to determining that no "search" occurred. 
The Court also viewed as undermining the homeowner's 
subjective expectation of privacy the limited nature of the dis-
closure, an aspect also of the Court's sui generis no "search" 
doctrine. 283 The Court determined that there was a constitu-
tional difference between listening to the words of a conversa-
tion, as had occurred in Katz, and in learning the numbers the 
homeowner dialed. The Court separated the words of a conver-
sation from the ·numbers dialed, stating that "pen registers do 
not acquire the contents of communications."284 With pen reg-
isters not even recording whether a conversation had occurred, 
the Court concluded that the pen register had "limited capabili-
ties. "285 In contrast, the dissents viewed individuals as having 
a strong privacy interest in "avoid[irig] disclosure of their per-
sonal contacts. "286 The conflicting characterizations may in 
part arise from the majority's dichotomous privacy approach 
and the dissent viewing privacy as falling on a spectrum. 287 
Significantly aiding the Court's no "search" determination 
was its characterization of what activity was under consider-
ation. For the majority, dialing from one's home was "immateri-
al for purposes of analysis in this case~8 because the tele-
phone company could have gotten the same information if it 
had used another person's telephone. The Court's privacy frame 
was thus limited to revealing the numbers dialed, not what one 
280 Id. 
283 See supra notes 231-53 and accompanying text. 
280 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741. 
285 Id. at 742. 
288 Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). 
287 Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, "Privacy is not 
a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all." Id. 
288 Id. at 743. 
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had done in his home. In contrast, a dissent invoked a broader 
privacy frame that encompassed the officers' learning of what 
the homeowner had done in his house. 289 
By limiting the privacy issue to numbers dialed, the Court 
was able to then characterize the homeowner as putting the 
dialed numbers in the public arena. Here the Court relied on 
cases decided before Katz to support its view of the privacy risk 
analysis. Prior to Katz, the Court had determined that officials 
may use technology to secretly record the exact words a person 
states to them, even if the disclosure of the words would violate 
a confidence. 290 Although these cases dealt with information 
given to an undercover officer or informant, the Smith Court 
extended this practice to the telephone company. 291 
The Smith Court thus constructed a "search" doctrine that 
allowed officials to gain access to information without any pro-
cedural steps, for the officials had not gotten a subpoena nor a 
search warrant.292 The telephone company's voluntary disclo-
sure of information that it did not routinely collect did not 
trouble the Court because it viewed the "numbers dialed" to be 
in the public arena. Perhaps the Court was prescient, anticipat-
ing both the development and routine use of caller identifica-
tion by the public, but at the time of Smith, recording local 
numbers dialed was not routine. But more importantly, the 
construction of the privacy issue itself-the numbers dialed 
versus learning about activity in the home-foreshadowed the 
Court's negative conclusion. 
Since Smith, the Court has often decided that officials did 
not conduct Fourth Amendment "searches" when using technol-
289 Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
200 Id. at 742 (citations omitted). 
291 Id. at 744-45. Supporting its decision was a recent decision determining 
that bank users had no reasonable expectations of privacy violated when banking 
officials turn over records documenting personal transactions to officials. United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). Similar to the Smith decision, the 
Court characterized the bank records as lacking privacy content: "checks are not 
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions." Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. It also similarly determined the depositor 
had voluntarily "exposed" such information to the public, namely the banks' em-
ployees. ld. 
292 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
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ogy to aid their senses. In a series of cases, the Court shifted 
the rhetorical arguments to allow officials with broad investiga-
tive powers outside the restraints of the Fourth Amendment. 
C. Using Technology to Enhance Officials' Senses: 
Often Not a "Search" 
In interpreting Katz, the Court has frequently determined 
that no "search" occurred when officials used technology to aid 
four of their senses in conducting investigations. The Court has 
most narrowly interpreted Katz as applied to officials' use of 
technology enhancing visual surveillance in public. In contrast, 
the Court has at times broadly interpreted Katz when applied 
to an investigative technique not involving technology-touch. 
And as previously discussed, Katz held that a "search" occurred 
when officials used technology to aid their listening to a conver-
sation in a public telephone booth, and Place held that no 
"search" occurred when officials used dogs to enhance their 
ability to smell drugs in luggage. In these opinions, the Court 
has frequently cited Katz and its progeny in contrasting and 
conflicting ways. In the end, what constitutes a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" is a fact-driven question, one allowing 
the Court to use a variety of rhetorical constructions to charac-
terize whether officials used technology to infringe constitution-
ally protected privacy. 
When applying the Katz standard to officials' use of tech-
nology to aid vision, the Court has looked to cases decided long 
before Katz articulated its "public exposure" doctrine: "What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even if in his own 
home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. "293 For example, in deciding that no search occurred 
when officers used a flashlight to look inside a car at night, 294 
the Court cited a 1927 decision, that examined officials' use of 
a "searchlight" to gaze onto the deck of a boat. 295 It did not 
293 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
2
"' Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983); see also United States v. 
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1987) (holding no "search" when official shined flash-
light into bam not within the home's curtilage). 
295 Brown, 460 U.S. at 740 (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 
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cite Katz for this holding, but it did cite Katz with regard to the 
question whether officials conducted a "search" by bending 
"down at an angle" to look inside the car.296 The Court noted 
that the "general public could peer into the interior of' the car; 
thus no "search" occurred. 297 
With this commonplace enhancement of vision not a 
"search," the Court then extended the rationale to cases in 
which fewer members of the public would be in a position to 
observe what an individual wanted to keep private. In a series 
of three cases, a majority of the Court held that no "search" 
occurred when officials used airplanes298 and a helicopterss 
to put themselves in a position to see better, while sometimes 
using sophisticated expensive equipment and sometimes just 
using the naked eye. In deciding that no "search" had occurred, 
the Court also discussed the particular area under surveillance, 
without explicitly invoking the "constitutionally protected area" 
language from its pre-Katz search paradigm. 
In 1986, the Court decided the same day two cases--Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo and Dow Chemical v. United States. In 
Ciraolo, officials used their "naked eye[s]"300 as they flew 
1,000 feet above "a fence-in backyard within the curtilage of a 
home" that appeared to contain marijuana; they also used a 
"standard 35 mm camera" to photograph the area. 301 In Dow, 
officials from the Environmental Protection Agency flew at an 
altitude as low as 1,200 feet over a chemical plant, occupying 
two thousand acres, and used a $22,000 mapping camera302 
that allowed them to magnify pictures to discern "wires as 
small as ~-inch in diameter."303 Three years later the frac-
tured Court decided Florida v. Riley, in which officials flew 400 
(1927)). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
296 Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 
476 u.s. 207 (1986). 
299 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
300 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. 
301 Id. at 209. 
302 Dow, 476 U.S. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 238. 
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feet above "a partially covered greenhouse in a residential 
backyard."804 No "search" occurred in any of these cases, but 
for different reasons. 
In all three cases, the Court discussed the area observed 
and the privacy traditionally associated with it. In both Ciraolo 
and Riley, officials flew over an area generally associated with 
privacy-the curtilage. The Court characterized the privacy 
associated with curtilage as limited because the "public" could 
fly over the area and see what it contained. 305 Both decisions 
found air travel and road travel to be similar and "routine": "In 
an age where private and commercial flight in the public air-
ways is routine, it is unreasonable" to expect the public not to 
view the curtilage.306 The Court crafted a view of "public" ex-
posure by considering whether a private person could have 
flown over the area and looked at it. In addition, the Ciraolo 
Court also hypothesized that from the ground some individuals 
could have seen the plants: "a power company repair mechanic 
on a pole"307 or a citizen "perched on top of a truck or a two-
level bus"308 could have looked over the ten-foot fence the 
homeowner had erected to preserve privacy. For the Court, 
officials simply used technology to put themselves in a "public" 
thoroughfare-the air.309 In an important concurring opinion, 
Justice O'Connor added a gloss on what "public"meant, a view 
also shared by four dissenters,310 suggesting that regulations 
promulgated by the Federal Aviation Agency do not define 
what constitutes "public" exposure. Instead what is "public" 
depends upon whether the public travels with "sufficiently 
3
"' Riley, 488 U.S. at 447-86 (plurality opinion). 
306 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14 (stating that "[a]ny member of the public flying 
in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers 
observed"). 
306 ld. at 215; Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 (plurality) (quoting this passage from 
California v. Ciraolo); id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting 
same passage). 
307 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. 
308 Id. at 211. 
309 Id. at 213 (stating that the "Fourth Amendment protection of the home has 
never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when 
passing by a home on public thoroughfares"). 
310 Riley, 488 U.S. at 461 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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regularity" at a particular altitude.311 The Court also nomi-
nally added that the viewing was done in a "physically 
nonintrusive manner"312 and did not reveal "intimate details" 
associated with the home and curtilage. 313 
In contrast, when the Court decided Dow Chemical, it had 
an additional technological question before it-whether a search 
occurred when officials used a sophisticated, expensive camera 
used by mapmakers. 314 It also had to discuss whether state 
trade secret laws, which might have barred private parties 
from taking such pictures, aided the company's claim to privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Dow Court relied on 
Ciraolo to justify officials' flying over the plant, but had to re-
construct what it meant by "public" access when state trade 
laws may have barred private individuals from doing what the 
government did. In its reconstruction, the Court instead fo-
cused on the kind of information gathered; it noted that photo-
graphs did not reveal "intimate details, "315 an aspect also only 
briefly mentioned in its later Riley decision discussing the use 
of a helicopter, but "central" to identifying what constitutes a 
"curtilage."316 It also attempted to shift attention to the limit-
ed use of this camera to by raising the question of much more 
sophisticated technology. It stated, "It may well be . . . that 
311 ld. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
112 Ciroolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (stating that "observations by officers ... took 
place within public navigable airspace . . . in a physically noninstrusive manner"); 
see also Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 (plurality opinion) (characterizing Ciroolo as "rea-
soning . . . the home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from inspec-
tion that involves no physical invasion"). 
113 Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (plurality) (stating that "no intimate details connect-
ed with the use of the home or [other parts of the) curtilage were observed, and 
there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury"). 
at• The majority characterized the photographs created by the camera as "es-
sentially like those commonly used in mapmaking." Dow Chemical v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986). The dissent not only specified how expensive 
the camera was, but also labeled it as a "sophisticated aerial mapping camera." 
Id. at 242, 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
318 Id. at 238. 
ua United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (stating that the Court 
has "identified the central component of [the curtilage) inquiry as whether the 
area harbors the 'intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life."') (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 
(1984), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
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surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated 
surveillance equipment not generally available in the public, 
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally pro-
scribed absent a warrant."317 
It also refused to look to state law to resolve the constitu-
tional privacy issue because, for the Court, to do so would be 
similar to invoking state trespass laws to determine what con-
stitutes a Fourth Amendment "search. "318 The Court also 
characterized the area viewed as one reflecting limited privacy 
interests.319 The Court explained, "We find it important that 
this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, 
where privacy expectations are more heightened."320 (Yet, in 
Ciraolo and Dow, officials viewed curtilage, but in those opin-
ions, the Court emphasized different facts.) 
The Court has also considered officials' enhancing their 
visual surveillance from the ground by using a "beeper," a "ra-
dio transmitter, ... which emits periodic signals that can be 
picked up by a radio receiver."321 In two cases, United States 
v. Knotts322 and United States v. Karo,323 the Court held that 
when officials surreptitiously installed a beeper on property 
and used it to keep track of property hypothetically in public 
view, they did not engage in a "search."324 Karo, however, did 
hold that monitoring of a beeper in a home for "a significant 
period" was a "search. "325 
Although the Court decided Knotts even before it heard the 
oral argument in Place, the decision resonates with the Court's 
sui generis characterization it created for dog sniffs of proper-
ty.326 In both Knotts and Place, the Court treated the use of a 
311 Dow, 476 U.S. at 238. 
318 I d. at 232. For a discussion of the Court's prior use of trespass law, see 
supra text accompanying notes 136-71. 
319 Dow, 476 U.S. at 236 (stating that the area is one "falling somewhere be-
tween 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking some the critical characteristics of 
both"). 
320 Id. at 237 n.4. 
321 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
:122 460 u.s. 276 (1983). 
323 468 u.s. 705 (1984). 
s:u Karo, 468 U.S. at 715; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
... Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
328 For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 228-32, 
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beeper and a drug-sniffing dog to be nominal additions to the 
officials' investigative capacities. The Knotts Court character-
ized using a beeper as merely "augmenting the sensory facul-
ties bestowed upon [officers] at birth," even though Knotts, 
officers had to rely on the beeper because their naked eyes 
failed them. 327 For the Knotts Court, a beeper was like the 
searchlight it had considered in 1927; both the beeper and the 
search light aided visual observation.328 The beeper simply 
allowed officials to keep their eye on the car they were follow-
ing, one ·"exposed" to the public. This construction of "public" 
assumes that officials and private individuals would be able to 
follow a person traveling in a car, no matter how long the trip 
may be. The Court crafted this as a "public" excursion by char-
acterizing officials' use of the beeper as being efficient. 329 In 
this decision, the Court did not ask whether the general public 
used this technology; instead it viewed officers as simply keep-
ing track of that which was already exposed to the public-the 
car containing the property with a hidden beeper.330 
The Karo Court adhered to Knotts' construction of a beeper 
as a minor sensory augmentation, but only to the point that 
the object with the beeper was in the "public's" eye. In Karo, 
officials monitored a beeper in a home for a lengthy period. 331 
Here the Court drew the line-one surrounding the house. The 
Court explained that because officials could not have seen in-
side the house during the extended monitoring of the beeper, 
the use of the beeper in this context was a "search. "332 What 
created a sharp division in the Court were different views con-
cerning the monitoring of property after it left the house. For 
the plurality, later monitoring was not tainted by the earlier 
monitoring of the house;333 for the dissent, the house monitor-
235-39. 
127 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
128 Id. at 282-83 (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). 
1129 Id. at 284 (stating that "[w)e have never equated police efficiency with 
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now"). 
130 Id. at 285. 
131 Karo, 468 U.S. 715. 
112 Id. 
131 Id. at 720 (stating that even if prior monitoring of "house or other place 
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ing "told police that the container had left the area. "334 
Under the Court's constructions of a Fourth Amendment 
"search," officers thus gained broad investigative powers free 
from Fourth Amendment constraints when the Court character-
ized information as already exposed to the public and when the 
technology they used was to nominally aid their vision. In dra-
matic contrast to this jurisprudence is the Court's construction 
of a Fourth Amendment "search" when officials used their basic 
sense of touch. The Court explicitly recognized this sharp dif-
ference in Bond u. United States,335 when it held that an offi-
cial had conducted a Fourth Amendment "search" when he 
"squeezed" a bus passenger's soft luggage located in the over-
head storage space. 
The Bond Court described the difference as one of degree: 
"[P]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than 
purely visual inspection."336 In considering whether the public 
routinely handles another person's luggage when traveling, the 
Court characterized the "public" exposure issue narrowly. The 
question was not whether we have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy that others will not handle our personal luggage, but 
rather the more specific question of whether we reasonably 
expect others to "squeeze" our luggage or to handle it in "an 
exploratory manner."337 The manner in which the Court con-
structed the public exposure issue helped to determine its re-
sult. In addition, the Court also ironically cited Place, which 
held that no "search" occurred when a dog sniffed a person's 
luggage, for the proposition that "luggage" is an "effect" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.338 As a result, the 
dissent aptly noted that one does not expect drug-sniffing dogs 
hovering near luggage,339 but a different doctrine created the 
was" illegal, that monitoring did not lead officials to discover that the property 
was now somewhere located in a warehouse). 
su Id. at 733 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
335 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000). 
338 Bond, 529 U.S. at 337. 
337 Id. at 338-39 
338 Id. at 336-37; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
339 Bond, 529 U.S. at 341. 
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no "search" conclusion in Place.340 
The Court also construed the public exposure doctrine as 
providing broad protection in another way. Instead of question-
ing why the passenger had not used hardsided luggage, the 
Court described the passenger as taking steps to protect priva-
cy by using an "opaque" bag.341 Yet in an older case, Califor-
nia v. Greenwood, when officials rummaged through opaque 
bags on the front lawn of a homeowner, the examining of the 
"trash" was not a Fourth Amendment search. 342 Even though 
the Court had in a prior decision refused to create a doctrinal 
distinction based on "worthy" and "unworthy" containers, 343 
the Court instead relied on its third-party disclosure cases and 
focused on the location of the garbage to justify its no "search" 
determination.344 After the homeowner "voluntarily" placed 
the bags outside the curtilage, the trash collector was free to 
alter his routine way of collecting trash in order to separate the 
homeowner's trash from everyone else's.345 The Court did not 
require the trash collector to act "routinely." For the Court, the 
homeowner "exposed" his stuff hidden in an opaque bag to the 
"public" by exposing it to the trash collector and "animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public. "346 
In contrast, the dissent discemed a clear reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the opaque bags. According to the dissent, 
"Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted 
notions of civilized behavior."347 
In describing what constitutes a "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" after Katz, the Court has thus used a variety of rhetor-
ical devices to characterize privacy. Even if an area historically 
... See Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
141 Id. In examining the touching of personal property in United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1984), the Court used its sui generis characteriza-
tion to justify its no "search" determination as to the testing of white powder 
contained in a mail package. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 247-53. 
86 486 u.s. 35, 37, 39 (1988). 
S4ll Se_e Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 
344 Id. at 40-41. 
... Id. at 37. 
,... Id. at 40-41. 
147 Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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reflects privacy, as does the curtilage of a home, it may lose 
this privacy under the public exposure doctrine; personal infor-
mation can become public information by disclosing it to a 
trusted third party; an investigative technique may be charac-
terized as sui generis, revealing only a single piece of informa-
tion; technological enhancement may be a search, depending 
upon which sense it enhances; routine use may have broad and 
narrow characterization under the public exposure doctrine. In 
the end, the public-private dichotomy has given the Court a 
means to label its conclusions. For example, an investigative 
practice gathered private information (a search) or it collected 
public information (no search). These shifting constructions of 
privacy are consistent with postmodernist perspectives, which 
rejects the idea of a grand theory to explain these search cases. 
What these· decisions do offer to the Court is a variety of 
rhetorical devices for constructing what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "search" when addressing the use of emerging 
technology. In Kyllo v. United States,348 the Court used sever-
al rhetorical devices to broadly protect the home from officials' 
use of a heat detection device, a nonphysically invasive investi-
gatory practice. As the latest chapter on officials' use of tech-
nology, this sharply divided opinion readily reveals the justices 
offering dramatically different interpretations of the technology 
under consideration and the selective use of precedents. 
IV. THE KYLLO COURT'S RHETORICAL STRATEGIES: 
CHARACTERIZING TECHNOLOGY AND PRECEDENT 
In Kyllo,349 the Court held that officials' use of a thermal 
imager on public streets to detect heat emissions from a home 
constituted a "search" because, for five justices, this informa-
tion was an "intimate detail" arising from the home's interior 
and because the "general public" did not use this technolo-
gy.350 The Court characterized its decision as one creating a 
bright-line rule, one needed to "take ... the original meaning 
3<8 5.33 u.s. 27 (2001) . 
.. 
9 Id. 
... Id. at 2046. 
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of the Fourth Amendment forward. "351 The majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Scalia, characterized this case as controlled 
by a blend of history and a fear of modern technology intruding 
into the home. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice 
Stevens, relied on precedent never mentioned by the majority 
opinion. To reach sharply conflicting conclusions and unusual 
alliances,352 the justices in Kyllo explicitly challenged the 
other's characterization of what was at issue in the case and 
which precedent offered guidance. In the end, these dueling 
opinions offer a panoply of rhetorical strategies for constructing 
what activity does or does not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
"search." 
Justice Scalia implicitly admitted that the Court in its 
"search" jurisprudence has at times reasoned backwards, decid-
ing that an activity was not a "search" because other Fourth 
Amendment doctrines would then apply. He stated, "(w]e have 
held that visual observation is no 'search' at all-perhaps in 
order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that war-
rantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. "353 In 
light of this admitted conclusory reasoning, Justice Scalia was 
then able to move away from his prior statement that "a search 
is a search"354 to the statement that the Katz standard ap-
plies when "assessing when a search is not a search. "355 Being 
a Justice fond of citing dictionaries to give meaning to the 
Constitution's text,356 he realized that relying on a dictionary 
for guidance would not support the Katz construction of a 
"search" because of its public exposure strand.357 In short, a 
Fourth Amendment "search" is a legal construction, one created 
by the justices in numerous cases, at times offering different 
paradigms for a Fourth Amendment "search" and shifting con-
38t Id. 
38
" Joining Justice Scalia's majority oprmon were Justices Souter, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer. ld. at 28. Joining Justice Steven's dissenting opinion were 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. at 41. 
383 Id. at 32 . 
... Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). 
385 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. 
386 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 n.1 (1991). 
387 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.l. 
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structions of what precedents mean in application. 
Unsurprisingly, the majority and dissenting opinions of-
fered different characterizations of many issues: (1) whether 
the thermal imager detected information outside or inside the 
home; (2) whether heat emissions levels are intimate or 
nonintimate information; (3) whether the general public had 
access to a thermal imager and whether access was relevant for 
determining a Fourth Amendment "search"; (4) whether label-
ing the use of a thermal imager to be a "search" was protecting 
our society from the slippery slope of allowing officers to use 
highly sophisticated sense-enhancing equipment (that is, 
whether to offer a broad or narrow ruling); (5) whether the 
framers of the Constitution intended to guard against release 
of this type of information; (6) whether the "public" exposure 
doctrine applied; (7) whether the Court's sui generis doctrine 
applied, as articulated in Place and followed in Jacobsen;358 
and (8) whether the pre-Katz "search" paradigm-with its focus 
on common law trespass-still had some vitality after Katz. 
When discussing these aspects of the case, the majority and 
dissenting opinions at times disagreed head-on and at other 
times simply offered different constructions. 
In Kyllo, an officer sat in the passenger seat of his compan-
ion officer's car on a public street, both in front of and behind 
Kyllo's house. 359 The officer pointed the thermal imager at the 
house, which revealed that "the roof over the garage and the 
side wall of [Kyllo's] home were relatively hot compared to the 
rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring 
homes in the triplex."360 As described by Justice Scalia, a 
thermal imager is a device that converts the infrared radiation 
emitted by all objects into "images based on relative 
warmth-black is cool, white is hot, and shades of gray connote 
relative differences."361 For Justice Scalia, the device was like 
a "video camera showing heat images";362 for Justice Stevens, 
068 For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 228-34, 
238-42, 247-53. 
'"" Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. 
360 Id. 
••• Id. 
s62 Id. 
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the device produced "vague" images,363 which he included in 
his appendix. 
Although the Justices did not dispute that the officers sat 
outside the house, they did disagree as to whether the thermal 
imager acquired information emanating from the house or 
information that was inside the house. Justice Scalia first char-
acterized the imager as coming inside the house; and then he 
characterized heat levels as "intimate" information because, 
under his bright-line construction, any information about the 
house that is "safe from the prying government eyes" consti-
tutes "intimate" information.364 In contrast, Justice Stevens 
viewed the heat levels as nonintimate information available 
outside the house and thus in the public arena.365 One way of 
understanding these contrary characterizations is to look at the 
precedents that the Justices cited and discussed as well as 
those that they failed to cite and discuss. 
To support his characterization of heat levels as 
nonintimate information arising outside the house, Justice 
Stevens' cited three cases never mentioned by Justice 
Scalia-Place, the drug-sniffing dog case, Jacobsen, the field-
testing of a white power case, and Greenwood, the trash 
case.366 In each of these cases, the Court held that no "search" 
occurred. 367 As previously discussed, one may view both Place 
and Jacobsen as cases falling within the sui generis paradigm, 
a perspective not applied by Justice Scalia probably because of 
his strong litany, "this is the home under surveillance," evi-
dencing a distinction of constitutional magnitude for Justice 
Scalia. Justice Stevens compared "heat waves" to "aromas" 
arising "in a kitchen, or in a laboratory, or opium den."368 For 
Justice Stevens, a person could not have a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the air in these circumstances.369Just as in 
163 Id. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
164 Id. at 38-39. 
168 Id. at 41-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
168 For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 342-46, 
357. 
161 Id. 
168 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
369 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Place, where a drug-detecting dog sniffed the air in an area 
historically imbued with privacy, the officers used a thermal 
imager to capture what was in the air. Justice Stevens also 
referred to Jacobsen for the proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment is not applicable when "the countervailing privacy 
interest is at best trivial."370 The homeowner, according to 
Justice Stevens, could have simply made sure that his home 
was "well insulated."371 Justice Stevens also invoked Green-
wood to compare heat loss to discarded trash bags-both are 
simply waste. 372 
In contrast, the precedent framing Justice Scalia's analysis 
was the "search" jurisprudence decided before Katz, a case that 
Justice Scalia had previously criticized as providing "a notori-
ously unhelpful test," a "self-indulgent test" that allowed the 
justices to subJectively decide what was "reasonable priva-
cy."373 For Scalia, history and the common law were impor-
tant, but not dispositive, references in determining whether a 
"search" had occurred. Scalia extensively cited and discussed 
the pre-Katz trespass paradigm, yet he admitted that the Court 
had "decoupled" trespass doctrines with resolution of the 
Fourth Amendment "search" issue.374 He nevertheless invoked 
the old cases to support his view that the home was a "consti-
tutionally protected area. "375 To this old doctrine, he explicitly 
added a factor that could erode privacy in the home, question-
ing whether the technology used by the government was gener-
ally available to the public.376 Because he characterized the 
imager as not in general public use and the information as 
coming from inside the home, the officials violated the 
homeowner's privacy.377 
Considering whether the public used a particular type of 
technology was not a new topic for the Court, but rather one 
870 Id. at 44-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
m Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
872 Id. at 43-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
371 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
17
• Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32. 
175 Id. at 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
ns Id. 
177 Id. at 39. 
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made as an explicit factor by Justice Scalia. Determining that 
the general public did not have access to this technology, Jus-
tice Scalia declared that he was "quite confidentO" in his as-
sessment;37s Justice Stevens, in contrast, roughly estimated 
the number of thermal imagers already in the stream of com-
merce. 379 He also questioned the wisdom of creating "general 
use" as an explicit factor, one with the potential to seriously 
erode privacy each year in light of emerging technologies.380 
With different degrees of concern about emerging technolo-
gies, Justices Scalia and Stevens also wrote opinions with dra-
matically different breadths. Justice Scalia offered a construc-
tion of the Fourth Amendment quite protective of the home as 
long as the Court characterizes the general public as not hav-
ing access to the technology employed by the officials. He cited 
new technologies that could destroy privacy in the home by 
"seeing" through walls.381 Justice Stevens instead offered a 
new, but narrower, construction for safeguarding the home; he 
distinguished between information derived from "off-the-wall' 
surveillance" and "through-the-wall" surveillance.382 For Jus-
tice Stevens, the officers in this case received information out-
side the house by "off-the-wall" surveillance. The integrity of 
the home was not in issue because the thermal imager did not 
see through the wall. Justice Stevens sought to support his 
dichotomy between off- and through-the walls by citing the 
view of what the Framers intended. He viewed the Framers as 
chiefly concerned with the "evil" of "physical entry into the 
home. "383 Because he did not view the thermal imager as in-
volving anything inside the house, he concluded that there was 
no "search. "384 
378 Id. at 39 n.6. 
379 Id. at 50 n.5 (Stevens, J, dissenting). 
380 Id. at 47. 
381 Id. at 35-36. 
'
82 Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
sss See also id. (stating that the "interest in concealing the heat escaping from 
one's house pales in significance to the 'chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed,' the 'physical entry of the house"') (quoting 
United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 
313 (1972)) . 
.... Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Both Justices also invoked classic slippery slope arguments 
to support their construction of what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "search" when officials use new technology. Justice 
Scalia characterized the thermal imager as being able to dis-
close "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her 
bath. "385 This image, when combined with his reference to 
technology that may someday allow a person to "see" through 
walls, invokes fear that the home will no longer be private. In 
contrast, Justice Stevens invoked the fear of not being able to 
allow officials to use sense-enhancing equipment to "detect the 
odor of deadly bacteria or chemicals for making a new type of 
high explosive"386 or to protect communities from "radioactive 
emissions. "387 For him, the air analysis in Place was an ap-
propriate model for understanding the thermal imager and 
emerging technology.388 He explicitly declared "a strong public 
interest" in allowing officials to detect harmful emissions with-
out Fourth Amendment restraints in order to protect communi-
ties.389 
With these contrasting characterizations of what was at 
issue in Kyllo, ironically both opinions cited the important 
public exposure decision of Smith v. Maryland, the pen register 
case.390 Justice Scalia briefly described it for the proposition 
that governmental officials do not necessarily engage in a 
"search" when they view information about the home or curti-
lage. 391 He then cited Ciraolo392 and Riley, 393 cases in 
which officials did not conduct a "search" by flying over a home 
and its curtilage to visually observe the area.394 For Justice 
Stevens, the information that officials get from a pen register 
(or a thermal imager in this case) is "indirect."395 Because 
3 
.. ld. at 38. 
ase Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
337 Id. at 45. 
388 ld. at 47-48. 
389 Id. at 45. 
390 See id. at 33; see also id. at 44. 
391 ld. at 34. 
393 476 u.s. 207 (1986). 
393 488 u.s. 445 (1989). 
3
"' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
'"' ld. at 44-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia did not overrule Smith, officials will still argue 
that the information they gathered from the home was "ex-
posed" to a third party. Like the general public use question, 
the issue of "public exposure" is a malleable one, for one could 
view the homeowner as exposing his heat to the public just as 
he allegedly "exposed" his numbers to the public by allowing 
the telephone company to record this information. In short, one 
can easily argue that great tension exists between the analysis 
in Kyllo and Smith. 
In the end, the numerous contrasting characterizations in 
Kyllo give the Court many options for writing future Fourth 
Amendment decisions as to the government's use of technology. 
The possibility of multiple constructions of what constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment "search" resonates with postmodern per-
spectives, particularly the perception that no grand theory 
exists to unify the legal arena. The Kyllo decision-perhaps like 
few others-so easily allows us to view the shifting construc-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly faced the question 
of how to interpret the Fourth Amendment when officials use 
new technology. The Court initially looked to property law 
when considering whether officials had acted unlawfully in 
listening to telephone conversations.396 In 1967, the Court in 
Katz explicitly declared a new paradigm for its "search" doc-
trine because it could no longer "ignore the vital role that the 
public telephone [had] come to play in private communica-
tion."397 It instead questioned whether the use of technology 
in the form of attaching an electronic bug to a public telephone 
booth invaded privacy. The Court's declared shift from a prop-
erty to a privacy perspective mirrored the Court's shifting char-
acterizations of which facts matter in a case.398 In time, 
396 Id. at 31-32. 
397 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
396 See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 114, at 405 (characterizing the "Court's meth-
od" for determining a "search" to be a "malleable, ad hoc test"). 
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Fourth Amendment scholars (and some Supreme Court justic-
es) complained that the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was 
simply a "mess."399 
One way to comprehend this "mess" is through the lens of 
postmodernism, which offers multiple perspectives on a given 
issue. In short, postmodernism anticipates the interpretive 
shifts, tums and "about-faces" in constructed legal doctrines. It 
also questions constructed doctrinal boundaries. For example, 
one may view an individual's interest in property, privacy, and 
personal security as encompassed by a single large circle. The 
"mess" may reflect the Court's selective highlighting (or selec-
tively ignoring) certain aspects or issues within this broad 
sphere.400 On the other hand, the "mess" may suggest that no 
"sphere" exists, except for the one constructed in a particular 
case. Under this view, the Court's "search" jurisprudence ap-
pears as a (constructed) fact-bound inquiry. Although the 
"mess" may reflect the Court's construction of an implicit spec-
trum for privacy, the Court's determination that no "search" 
occurred may signify that the officials' invasion of an 
individual's interest (whether in property, privacy or personal 
security) was at one end of the spectrum, representing nominal 
intrusions. Under this spectrum construction, the Court could 
later characterize a similar act to be a "search" because of how 
it characterizes additional factors, with the Court viewing the 
individual's interest as on another part of the spectrum. Other 
399 In his essay for this symposium issue, Professor Clancy highlighted the 
malleability of the Court's "search" jurisprudence: 
The Court's expectation of privacy analysis has many flaws . . . . It ac-
cordingly leaves the fluid concept of privacy to the vagaries of shifting 
Court majorities, which are able to manipulate the concept to either ex-
pand or contract the meaning of the word at will. Indeed, it is difficult-if 
not impossible to say exactly what the word means. Thus, while a liberal 
Court substituted privacy in lieu of property analysis to expand protected 
interests, a conservative Court has employed privacy analysis as a vehicle 
to restrict Fourth Amendment protection. 
Thomas K Clancy, Coping with Technological Change: Kyllo and the Proper Ana-
lytical Structure to Measure the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 Miss. L.J. 
525, 533-34 (2002). 
400 For example, even when the Katz Court announced a privacy focus for a 
Fourth Amendment "search," it nevertheless added in a footnote that the Fourth 
Amendment protects property as well as privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.4. 
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metaphorical constructions of the Court's "search" jurispru-
dence are possible because postmodernism allows us to view 
the Court's "search" jurisprudence from many perspectives, as 
it rejects the notion of a grand legal theory that acts as a re-
straint in decisionmaking. 
The Katz "search" standard questioned whether a person 
subjectively and reasonably expected privacy. In applying this 
standard, the Court constructed several different views for 
officials' using sensory-enhancing devices. For example, it de-
clared that officials' enhancing their visual capacities did not 
constitute a "search" unless the device recorded the presence of 
an object in the home for a lengthy period. Contrasting this 
wide breadth for technically enhanced visual surveillance was 
the Court's narrow view for officials' using their hands to 
"squeeze" luggage, a "search" not using technology. Tactile 
observation such as "squeezing" soft-sided luggage, was a 
"search" in part because the Court characterized it as more 
invasive than visual surveillance. 
The Court also framed the public exposure strand of Katz 
differently, distinguishing between "private" information and 
"public" information. To illustrate, few people have access to an 
expensive map making camera; yet, for the Court, when offi-
cials flew over an industrial complex, the Court characterized 
map making technology as in the public domain, undermining 
an individual's expectation of privacy. In contrast, the Court 
held that a "search" occurred when officials "squeezed" soft 
luggage on a bus even though the traveling public routinely 
handles the luggage of fellow travelers. The Court created a 
narrower frame for tactile observation by questioning whether 
the public routinely touches luggage in an "exploratory man-
ner." 
The Court also created a special category for drug-detect-
ing dogs sniffing luggage; this enhancement of officials' ability 
to smell drugs was not a "search." The Court did not question 
whether the public routinely uses dogs to sniff the luggage of 
other passengers; instead, the Court constructed a special sui 
generis class for this type of sense enhancement, characterizing 
the intrusion as minor, disclosing only limited information. By 
constructing an analogy to this "unique" class, the Court later 
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extended this sui generis approach to the field testing of drugs. 
The Court's latest chapter in the book of "search" jurispru-
dence-Kyllo v. United States-prominently reveals the Justices' 
conflicting characterizations of officials' using technology to 
investigate criminal activity. With some articulated limitations, 
a majority of the Court returned to the notion of a "constitu-
tionally protected area," a prominent issue under its prior prop-
erty paradigm. Five Justices held that officers conducted a 
"search" when using a thermal imager to scan Kyllo's home 
from a vehicle on public streets in front of and behind the 
house.401 Although the imager measured heat loss, this emis-
sion was not "waste" or trash for the majority. (The dissent, in 
contrast, cited precedent that indicated that no "search" oc-
curred when officials rummaged through opaque trash bags left 
outside the curtilage.)402 Nor was the emission like the aroma 
arising from luggage exposed to dogs at an airport. (The majori-
ty did not refer to cases involving the sui generis paradigm-dog 
sniffs or field drug testing; the dissent did discuss this prece-
dent.)403 To protect privacy, the majority declared that all in-
formation shielded from the public's eye in the home was inti-
mate, subject to Fourth Amendment protection, as long as the 
general public did not have access to the particular technology 
used by officials. 404 The majority viewed the thermal imager 
as revealing "intimate" information inside the home and char-
acterized the public as not having access to thermal 
imagers.405 (The dissent characterized the information as aris-
ing outside the home, questioned the creation of "public access" 
as an explicit factor and viewed the public as having access to 
thermal imagers.)406 
The Kyllo majority thus built within its new "search" juris-
prudence a question with an evolving response: whether the 
general public has access to the technology used by officials. 
The question of public access, when considered with the Court's 
401 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41. 
..,. Id. at 42 n.2 . 
... See id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) . 
... Id. at 37-38. 
... Id. at 34-35. 
406 Id. at 42-43. 
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general public exposure cases, will keep unsettled what is "pub-
lic" and what is "private" information. The difficulty of drawing 
analogies from precedent discussing "public" exposure still 
remains, particularly when one compares the Kyllo decision 
with Smith, a case cited by both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Kyllo.401 In Smith, officers installed a pen register 
at a telephone company to record the local numbers a person 
dialed in his home:408 In Smith, the Court held that the use of 
the pen register was not a "search;~09 in Kyllo, the use of the 
thermal imager on the public streets to detect heat loss was a 
"search.~10 Even though the Kyllo majority cited Smith, the 
two cases seem in great tension: the Smith Court characterized 
the homeowner as voluntarily exposing the numbers dialed in 
the privacy of his home to the "public"; the Kyllo Court charac-
terized the homeowner as retaining a privacy interest in not 
having officials learn of heat loss from this home. The Kyllo 
Court admitted that the "search" jurisprudence at times re-
flects backwards reasoning, determining that no "search" oc-
curred in order to avoid applying other Fourth Amendment 
do.ctrines. 
Even though the Kyllo majority explicitly identified public 
use as a factor, the Court could nevertheless emphasize differ-
ent facts in the next "search" case involving the home.411 Al-
ternatively the Court could construct a new paradigm, just as it 
did in Katz, when it held that its prior standard failed to con-
sider the current role of technology in society. The modern 
Court may view itself as similarly situated to the Katz Court; 
407 See id. at 33; see also id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
... Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
f09 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47 . 
.,. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
411 See generally Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002) (upholding drug 
testing of students' engaging in extracurricular activities). In Earls, the Court 
interpreted Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which upheld 
the public schools' drug testing of athletes. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2560. Even 
though Vernonia extensively described the special risks that athletes face when 
they take drugs, the Earls Court stated that the distinction between athletes and 
other students engaging in extracurricular activities was not "essential" to its 
decision in Vernonia. Id. at 2561. Instead, the Court characterized Vernonia as 
focusing on the schools' responsibility and custodial duties. Id. at 2569. 
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Katz discarded Olmstead,412 a case in which the Court held 
that the wiring tapping of a telephone in a home was not a 
"search" because no trespass occurred.413 The modern Court 
may implicitly (or explicitly) discard the Katz standard, again 
viewing changes in technology and changes in society as requir-
ing a different paradigm for constructing a Fourth Amendment 
"search." Such doctrinal changes from postmodernist perspec-
tives do not compel us to cast aspersions on the Court, but 
rather to reflect on the inherent nature of constructed legal 
doctrines and their relationship to an evolving society. 
m Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
413 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
